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Abstract—It is no exaggeration to say that since the introduc-
tion of Bitcoin, blockchains have become a disruptive technology
that has shaken the world. However, the rising popularity of the
paradigm has led to a flurry of proposals addressing variations
and/or trying to solve problems stemming from the initial
specification. This added considerable complexity to the current
blockchain ecosystems, amplified by the absence of detail in many
accompanying blockchain whitepapers.
Through this paper, we set out to explain blockchains in a
simple way, taming that complexity through the deconstruction
of the blockchain into three simple, critical components common
to all known systems: membership selection, consensus mechanism
and structure. We propose an evaluation framework with insight
into system models, desired properties and analysis criteria, using
the decoupled components as criteria. We use this framework to
provide clear and intuitive overviews of the design principles
behind the analyzed systems and the properties achieved. We
hope our effort will help clarifying the current state of blockchain
proposals and provide directions to the analysis of future pro-
posals.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 2008 Satoshi Nakamoto released Bitcoin [150], high-lighting the power and importance of distributed systems.
The use of distributed systems in our lives has been trans-
parently controlled by significant actors. The introduction
of Bitcoin provided the public with insight into ungoverned
distributed systems and sparked a movement towards decen-
tralization. Initially, the blockchain technology went vastly
unnoticed and was heavily integrated with the deep web due to
its pseudonymity properties [55, 217]. However, the concept
of the blockchain quickly gained interest and grew to what
it is today. The growing interest promoted the introduction
of new chains and the growth of distributed ledger tech-
nologies [4, 10, 14, 78, 137, 141, 170]. However, the rising
popularity of the paradigm has led to a flurry of proposals
addressing variations and/or trying to solve problems arising
from the initial specification.
The complexity introduced through popularity was am-
plified by the absence of detail in the proposals. As an
example, the vast majority were presented through white
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papers [53, 123, 124, 150, 155, 168, 193, 196, 204], wiki
documentations [116, 156, 180, 183] and websites [5, 11,
130, 133]. This is in contrast with the traditional academic
research that conveys results through scientific publications
typically peer-reviewed by specialists of particular domains,
like distributed systems, cryptography, networking or game
theory [63, 84, 94, 120]. The lack of detail has left room for
interpretation that has sometimes led researchers to different
conclusions [22, 75, 102].
Through this paper, we set out to explain blockchains in a
simple way, taming that complexity through the deconstruc-
tion of the blockchain into three simple, critical components
common to most known systems: membership selection, con-
sensus mechanism, and structure. The membership selection
component determines a committee of nodes that participate
in the consensus; the consensus mechanism component is
responsible for deciding on the next block, run by the selected
committee of nodes; and the structure component represents
how the data is organized in the blockchain. Thanks to our
deconstruction, we are able to provide a clear and unique
landscape of blockchains, as depicted in Figure 1. We then
propose an evaluation framework with insights into different
key system models, desired properties, and analysis criteria,
using the decoupled components as parameters. We use this
framework to provide overviews of the design principles
behind the analyzed systems and the achieved properties.
There are notable works aggregating and analyzing
blockchains, each providing unique evaluation but primarily
focusing on one aspect and constructing specific frameworks to
comparatively analyze. Cachin and Vukolic´ present a compar-
ison of consensus protocols in permissioned blockchains [49].
Abraham and Malkhi also present the idea of deconstructing
the blockchain into layers [18] but with a focus on relating
Nakamoto’s consensus versus Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT)
protocols. Similarly, Vukolic´ [212] explores the contrast be-
tween blockchains and BFT replicated state machines, pointing
to scalability problems faced by both and provide insight into
upcoming proposals. Gramoli [97] investigates mainstream
blockchains and discusses classical Byzantine consensus in the
context of the blockchain and discusses some of the dangers
of misunderstanding guarantees, problems that we address and
systematize in our paper. Wang et al. [213] approach the
blockchain consensus mechanisms in the perspective of game
theory and the strategies of adoption of nodes. Bano et al. [26]
provide an overview on how different blockchain consensus
work, and compare existing Proof-of-* against other proposed
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2Figure 1. The blockchain landscape.
consensus mechanisms based on their properties. However, no
other work has deconstructed the blockchain into these unique
components and analysed all three.
While existing work provides good analysis of specific sets
of the properties of blockchains, it remained challenging, even
for the educated but non-expert readers to get a thorough
and comparative picture of the design principles of different
complicated systems. To our knowledge, we are the first to
classify blockchain based on a decomposition into membership
selection, consensus mechanism and structure, categorizing
and providing an analysis of leading proposals. As an addition
to our analysis, we provide an overview of the attacks and
threats related to membership selection, consensus goals, and
structural assumptions. We hope that our analysis will clarify
future design directions and inspire new designs based on in-
novative coherent combinations revealed by our decomposition
and categorization.
Thus, this paper presents the following contributions:
• It innovatively deconstructs the blockchain into three
simple, critical components: membership selection, con-
sensus mechanism and structure.
• It provides an evaluation framework with insight into
system models, desired properties and analysis criteria,
using the decoupled components as parameters.
• It provides a clear and intuitive overview of the design
principles behind analyzed systems and their properties,
in terms of the parameters above.
• It proposes, based on the analyzed state of the art,
a categorization of membership selection and consen-
sus approaches. In addition, it provides generic charts
representing the design principles for each category of
membership selection, to simplify future designs.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II pro-
vides background information about blockchains and the core
properties relating to our decomposition. Section III outlines
the criteria used for comparison and analysis. Section IV dis-
cusses and analyzes the membership selection and proposals.
Section V provides an analysis of consensus mechanisms.
Section VI overviews structure proposals for the blockchain.
Section VII highlights proposed attacks relating to the mem-
bership selection and consensus. Section VIII discusses other
insights and aspects. We conclude with a summary of our
analysis and discuss future directions.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we explore the foundational concepts of the
blockchain and discuss the initial specification of Bitcoin. We
then discuss the applicability of blockchains and conclude by
highlighting the known impediments.
A. Blockchain
Blockchain is an append-only distributed ledger of trans-
actions. First introduced with Bitcoin [150], the blockchain
originated as a decentralized electronic payment system, which
removed the need for any third-party involvement for payment
transfers. The original Bitcoin blockchain organized data as
a chain of blocks directed by utilizing the block hash val-
ues, hence the name “blockchain”. Later proposals expanded
from a single chain to parallel chains [120, 209, 221] and
graphs [25, 128, 168]. This has led to the term “blockchain”
becoming a misnamed concept for distributed ledgers.
The decentralized nature of blockchains means that all
nodes verify and store the transactions that have taken place
in the system, and propose new blocks to append to the
chain. The blockchain structure can be seen as a linearly
increasing linked list of transactions batched into blocks.
3The chain begins with a genesis block at index 0 and each
block appended links to its direct predecessor forming the
chain. This, however, is the combination of pre-existing ideas
constructed together to form what the blockchain is today.
Haber et al. [98] first introduced the idea of timestamping
to digitally verify a document, which is paralleled by the
timestamped block being appended on the chain. Similarly,
the distributed ledger of cryptographically-linked blocks can
be represented as a fully replicated state machine [192], where
the state machine is a hashchain [125].
From the initial specification detailed by Bitcoin, various
blockchains have been proposed; improving and extending
the original work by adding new features and functional-
ity on top of the decentralized payment. An example is
Ethereum [216], which introduced the ability to execute Turing
complete code on the blockchain and perform conditional
payments based on actions through smart contracts. A number
of new blockchains [3, 4, 9, 13, 14, 137], and distributed
ledger technologies [10, 170], have been created to fulfill
new purposes and help integrate the blockchain into critical
infrastructure today.
Such extensions have provided ways for which blockchains
can be applied to existing systems. Transport [56, 66], Health-
care [139, 165, 223], and Finance [10, 106, 170] have shown
potential for the use of blockchain technology and a number of
applications are being used in systems today [107, 108, 135,
144].
B. Bitcoin
The seminal paper on Bitcoin [150] was the first to introduce
blockchain as the completely decentralized electronic cash
system on a peer-to-peer network. It facilitates pseudonymous
payment between two parties without the requirement of a
third party.
Each account on the Bitcoin blockchain is composed of a
public and private key pair. The hash of a public key identifies
the account of the key owner by forming an address. The
public key address is used to accept coins, and the private key
of an account is used to authorize a spending. Payment occurs
with a “payer” (or “payers”) signing a transaction using the
private key, transferring assets to the address of the “payee” (or
“payees”). Once signed, the “payer” broadcasts the transaction
to the network, where the transaction is then mined into a
block. The “payee(s)” can use its private key of the address
to claim its ownership.
A transaction contains three data fields, namely metadata,
inputs, and outputs. The metadata field records the unique ID
of the transaction (i.e. the hash of the entire transaction), the
size of the transaction, the number of inputs, the number of
outputs, and a lock_time field defining the time period that
one have to wait to validate this transaction. An input specifies
a previous transaction using its hash value. The input also
contains the index of the previous transaction’s outputs that
is being claimed (as there may be more than one output).
A valid signature for the current transaction is also required
to prove the ownership of the claimed output (of the previous
transaction), by using the signing key associated to the address
of the claimed output. An output has two fields, namely
value and address. They define the value to be transferred
to the address. Bitcoins are just transaction outputs with an
arbitrary value with 8 decimal places of precision. The smallest
possible value is 10−8 BTC which is called 1 Satoshi. For
the transaction to be valid, every input must be an unspent
output (i.e. coin) of a previous transaction. Every input must
be digitally signed. The total value in the input field must be
no smaller than the total value in the output field. If the total
value in the input is greater than the total value in the output,
then the difference between the two total values is called a
transaction fee.
Transactions are broadcast in the network. If a node receives
the same transaction multiple times, it only broadcasts it once.
So that transactions will not be broadcast in the network
forever. For a received valid transaction, a node will use
it as a part of the input in its “mining” process, and the
transaction is accepted if it is included in the blockchain.
All nodes in the network have the option to participate in
the mining process, computing a valid hash as the Proof-of-
Work (PoW). We will detail different Proof-of-Work systems
in § IV-A. The block containing a set of verified transactions
is then propagated through the network, and if valid and has
been decided as the correct extension of the chain, the block
containing transactions will be accepted.
The creator of a block that is included in the chain obtains
bitcoins as reward of its work. A reward has two parts,
namely a pre-defined amount of coins as mining reward, and
transaction fees of contained transactions.
The seminal work introduced by Bitcoin was a scalable
membership selection and consensus, dubbed Nakamoto’s
Consensus, discussed in § V-A, as well as the application of a
distributed timestamping service for decentralized validity on
a ledger. This assembly of ideas presented new technology,
causing a paradigm shift in digital payments and providing a
number of new possibilities for this technology to evolve.
C. Smart Contracts
As the blockchain continues to evolve, new functionali-
ties emerge, allowing them to be applied in numerous use
cases and further integrated into daily use. One major evo-
lutionary impact was the introduction of Smart Contracts in
Ethereum [78, 216]. The Ethereum blockchain runs a virtual
machine in the lower layer, known as the EVM, holding
the blockchain state and executing all blockchain commands.
Through this, Ethereum introduced the functionality to run
bytecode on the EVM of all nodes and interact directly with the
blockchain. This provides mechanisms not only for conditional
payment, but programmable applications that interact directly
with the blockchain verified by all nodes.
A smart contract is typically written in a high-level lan-
guage, such as Solidity [77], and compiled down to bytecode.
A transaction is then composed to deploy the contract on
the blockchain. The transaction data contains the contract
code and any constructor arguments to instantiate the contract.
Once deployed, the contract address is returned as part of the
transaction receipt and can be interacted with. If a contract
4function modifies the blockchain state, it must be invoked
through a transaction, which does not require any asset transfer
but must have enough “Gas”1. However, any functions that do
not require state modification, or, viewing any public variables
can be invoked without a required transaction.
Since the blockchain is seen as “immutable”, once a contract
has been deployed, it cannot be modified. This has been
revealed as a severe weakness for many applications, as any
vulnerable code is stuck on the blockchain and cannot be
updated or patched. Current techniques often require “proxy”
contracts which allow for contacts to be “upgraded” with
minimal impact2.
Most blockchain applications, known as Distributed Appli-
cations, or DApps, interact with contracts through libraries,
written in languages such as JavaScript, Python, Go or Java.
These are often seen as mobile or web applications and are
similar to those used commonly today.
Other blockchain systems, such as HyperLedger [105] and
EoS [6] also provide smart contract capabilities. However,
blockchains such as Bitcoin allow for “scripts” to be written
into the data field of their transactions and executed on the
blockchain directly. Overall, smart contracts allow for the
blockchain to be integrated with business logic and allow
conditional payment through contract invocation.
D. Known Causes of Blockchain Varieties
The original Bitcoin blockchain provided the foundation
for blockchain systems today by introducing the decentralized
peer-to-peer transaction system. However, aspects of Bitcoin
served as focal points of evolution to new blockchain varieties.
We list below the main triggers for these varieties.
1) Transient Forks
With multiple nodes working to propose new blocks, there is
a high chance of concurrent proposals. With structures that
follow a single, canonical chain, the concurrent proposals
create a transient branch in the chain, known as a fork, in
which the proposed blocks share a common predecessor and
can continue on their own separated path. At this point, the
nodes of the network must decide which is the correct chain
to extend through consensus. We defer the explanation of the
different consensus approaches to Section V. The occurrence
of forks impact transaction finality and can lead to a case of
double-spending, where the same coin is spent multiple times
on different branches. However, forks can also be used for
protocol upgrades, known as hard forks, where the system
diverges from a given block height and all nodes running the
latest version will be on the same branch.
2) Storage Size
The blockchain is designed as an append only ledger, result-
ing in an linearly increasing structure. This requires storage
1Ethereum employs the concept of Gas to prevent indefinite code execution.
Each instruction on the Ethereum Virtual Machine has an associated cost, so
function invocations would have a cost to run.
2A proxy contract provides an address which will always point to the
“current” version of a contract, so if a new upgrade is deployed on the chain,
people will still use the same contract address to access the upgraded contract.
space that is growing at dynamic rates. Bitcoin, currently
182.206GB3 and Ethereum is 94GB (with Geth’s Fast Sync)4
and 600+GB (full node)5 reveal the size requirements for a
node on the blockchain. The growing storage requirements
present limitations for certain devices to participate, such as
mobile or IoT, as well as long-term problems in maintaining a
node. Current efforts, such as pruning and light clients, focus
on this problem and aim to provide low space requirements
for nodes.
3) Scalability
Blockchains provide a seemingly scalable service to growing
numbers of users and nodes. However, this can be con-
trasted by the increasing energy consumption of Proof-of-
Work blockchains and, in some cases, increased transaction
latency. Scalability of decentralized distributed systems is a
major problem area for a number of systems with a numerous
proposals for improvements. Another important aspect of
scalability is the system throughput, defined as the number
of transactions per second included into a block, which is
one of the major hindrances to blockchain deployment. When
compared to current centralized systems, blockchain systems
fail to meet throughput requirements to handle daily spending.
The cost of true decentralization is observed through the
lower throughput. However, many efforts are being made
to improve the blockchain throughput while still offering
the same guarantees [212]. We divert further discussions of
scalability to Section VIII-D.
4) Clique Formation and Centralization
Bitcoin’s primary attraction was the decentralized distributed
system, without a required presence of a controlling party.
Although the ideal blockchain would have homogeneous nodes
distributed and owned by unique users, the incentive of block
reward proved to be more profitable if miners formed cliques
to produce blocks. Due to these cliques, seen as mining
pools in current PoW blockchains, the decentralization of the
system has been heavily impacted. For example, in Bitcoin’s
blockchain, as of February 2019, 4 pools can be seen to control
larger than 50%, and 15 pools control more than 80% of the
total reported hashrate [37].
III. ANALYSIS CRITERIA
In this section, we introduce the criteria used in evaluation
and comparison of the different membership selection and
consensus mechanisms. We begin by describing the common
assumptions made and follow by describing the properties of
membership selection and consensus.
A. Common Assumptions
Both membership selection and consensus require assump-
tions to achieve their goals, often encapsulating system behav-
ior (e.g. network delay, node numbers, etc) as well as a threat
model (e.g. threshold of faults, adversary behavior).
3https://www.blockchain.com/charts/blocks-size. Accessed 09 Sep 2018.
4https://etherscan.io/chart2/chaindatasizefast. Accessed 13 Sep 2018.
5https://bitinfocharts.com/ethereum/ Accessed on 13 Sep 2018.
51) Network
The network assumptions detail the bound of time for mes-
sages to be delivered and can be categorized into three distinct
classifications:
• Synchronous: there is a known, fixed upper bound on the
time required for a message to be sent from one processor
to another.
• Asynchronous: there is no upper bound on the time taken
for a message to be delivered. It is proven by Fischer
et al. [87] that it is impossible to have deterministic
consensus schemes in an asynchronous model.
• Partially Synchronous: the upper bound for message
delivery exists but is unknown a-priori [71].
2) Online Presence
The online presence considers whether all nodes are online at
any given point in time, or only a subset of nodes.
• All Online: The model in which all nodes are online and
have network connections to other nodes.
• Sleepy: The sleepy model considers crash fault tolerance
in the BFT context. This concept was initially introduced
for classical state machine replication [132], and later
introduced for blockchains [29, 163]. Nodes are classified
as “alert” or “sleepy”. An alert node is one that is
currently online and has predictable network connections
to all other alert nodes. A sleepy node is one that is
currently offline, but may become alert later, and vice
versa.
3) Adversary Threat Model
The adversary threat model captures the threshold of Byzan-
tine behavior that a system can tolerate. These threat models
have two distinct properties, type and threshold, where the
type defines what adversary is referenced, and the threshold is
the upper bound on Byzantine power specific to the type [18].
Traditionally, Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) systems put an
assumption on the maximum number of committee members
and clients that an attacker can control. This is often referred to
as the maximum number f of Byzantine nodes. In our generic
analysis, in order to capture all situations, we define N as the
total voting power of the system, and f as the maximum voting
power controlled by all attacker nodes (as a fraction of N ).
The f − to−N relation becomes then a fraction defining the
maximum percentage voting power that can be controlled by
the adversary without the system failing to reach its goals.
• Traditional: The number of votes a Byzantine actor can
control, often represented as the number of Byzantine
votes f as a proportion of N , the total number of votes.
• Computational: The adversary is defined by the amount
of computing power they control. The adversary is ex-
pressed as the amount of computing power f with respect
to the total computing power of the system, N .
• Stake: For stake-based systems, the adversary is defined
by the amount of asset the adversary has to stake. This is
defined as the amount of a resource in possession of the
adversary f in regards to total resources possessed by all
users in the system N .
• Space: The amount of storage space readily available
to an adversary with low-latency reads. This adversary,
similar to the computational adversary, controls a percent-
age of the total storage space in the system, represented
respectively as f and N .
4) Trust
The trust considers whether the proposal assumes a trusted
presence to interact and participate.
• Hardware: The proposed mechanism assumes that trusted
hardware components will be used in the operation and
all output is taken as correct.
• Participants: This assumes that trusted authorities or
participants, through policy or otherwise, are operational
in this mechanism. This can be seen as an oracle or
trusted entities in the system.
• None: This means there is no assumption on the trust
of the hardware or participants. All aspects assume that
there is no trust required in the system to operate.
B. Membership Properties
The membership selection provides the subset of nodes that
are then admitted to participate in the consensus or block
proposal. Each mechanism exhibits properties that allow for
classification and categorization.
1) Openness
The openness represents the rules on how nodes participate in
the system and how committees are formed. This can be seen
as a fundamental aspect in the design of blockchain algorithms
and depicts its suitability for certain environments [47, 212].
• Permissionless: A permissionless, or public, system has
no restriction on the set of candidates and their behavior.
That is, the size of the consensus committee is not pre-
defined nor fixed, and a node is able to participate or
leave at any given time.
• Permissioned: A permissioned, or private, system has
complete restriction on the nodes participating. A node
must join the system by being accepted in and as a known
member. The consensus committee is often predefined, or,
operates under the assumption that all nodes are known
to all.
• Partially-Permissioned: A partially-permissioned system
is often seen in consortium scenarios, where there are cer-
tain restrictions present on either the consensus members
or the node participation. Some systems allow nodes to
freely join, but only a pre-defined subset of nodes form
the consensus; other systems require nodes to be accepted
in the system but allow for any node to become a member
of the consensus.
2) Selection Approach
The selection approach details the process used to rank and/or
select the nodes which will form the consensus group. These
6approaches are used to differentiate the consensus nodes from
other nodes according to the way they prove to have met the
pre-defined criteria for some specific parameter(s). In order to
increase the probability of being selected, a node must show
that it is better than other nodes according to the selection
criteria. For example:
• Work: This work parameter measures the “amount of
valid work” a node has produced and can be directly
related to the amount of computational power used to
produce the work.
• Stake: The amount of resources the node has “staked”.
This can be seen as the node’s balance, or, the amount of
asset the node has decided to place as stake. For a node
to increase probability, they would have to increase the
amount of stake.
• Resource Count: In some mechanisms each individual re-
source, for example CPUs, counts towards the probability
of selection. For a node to increase the probability of
selection, they must possess more of the elected resource.
3) Incentive
To allow for scalable and robust consensus, some schemes
provide a mechanism to incentivize honest behavior through
reward or punishment. We consider the quality of incentives a
major factor for the stability and effectiveness of the selection
mechanisms and consensus. When effective, they introduce
rationality and thus influence node participation and heavily
constrain Byzantine behavior.
• Reward: measures the benefit that one will get as a result
of its contribution to the system.
• Punishment: measures the cost that one needs to pay if it
behaves incorrectly. It is used to discourage any malicious
behavior, and plays an important part to the efficiency of
the system and may affect the overall performance.
C. Consensus Properties
Consensus forms the core property of the blockchain where
the valid blocks are agreed upon to be appended to the chain.
The blockchain consensus is composed of consensus instances,
where each consensus instance is the decision for the block
decision at each index of the chain. The valid blocks to be
decided contain valid transactions, defined as the following.
Definition 1 (Transaction). A command that changes the state
of the Blockchain.
Definition 2 (Valid Transaction). A transaction that is con-
sistent with the current blockchain state and has correct
signatures and structure.
1) Generic Blockchain Consensus Properties
The consensus instances exhibit properties that define how the
decision is made and what guarantees are in place.
• Agreement: For a given consensus instance i, if a correct
node decides block B, then all correct nodes decide B.
• Termination: All correct nodes eventually decide [136,
211].
Figure 2. Proof-of-Work flow.
• Validity: If all correct nodes propose a valid transaction
before starting a consensus instance i, then the block
decided in i is not empty.
2) Blockchain State Properties
The blockchain state provides the foundation for the way
transaction finality is interpreted and how state transitions are
effected. However, both properties may not be observed at the
same time.
• Total Order Prefix: A blockchain exhibits a total order
prefix when consensus instances have terminated with
agreement on a common prefix of states σ0, σ1, . . . σi, but
have not yet terminated for the states starting from σi+1.
This is commonly observed with a fork [89, 90, 160].
• Total Order: A blockchain exhibits total order when all
consensus instances have terminated and agreement has
been reached for all states.
IV. MEMBERSHIP SELECTION
In this section, we present an overview of the membership
selection algorithms deployed in current blockchain systems.
The primary purpose of membership selection is to determine
a committee of nodes to participate in the consensus, whose
primary goal is to propose, or validate, blocks and provide a
decision for the correct block at the next index of the chain.
A summary of our overview is presented in Table I.
A. Proof-of-Work (PoW)
Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the mechanism used by Bitcoin and
most mainstream blockchain systems today. It was proposed
in this context to address the Sybil Attacks [69], where an
attacker creates multiple entities and dominates the consensus
committee. In particular, PoW addresses the Sybil attack by
requiring nodes to prove that they have performed some work
at a non-negligible cost, such as consumed electricity, time and
hardware. The “work” is to produce a solution to a puzzle,
where the solution is relatively difficult to find, but can be
easily verified by others. This, in turn, acts as a disincentive for
attackers due to the involved cost. In Bitcoin and its variants,
the process of working to obtain a solution is called mining,
where the nodes performing the work are called miners.
Proof-of-Work in Bitcoin was heavily derived from the ini-
tial proposal by Dwork et al. to combat junk mail [72], which
was later adopted by HashCash [36]. The technique has two
variants of implementations, the CPU-bound approach, as seen
in Bitcoin [150], and the memory-bound approach [17, 70].
7Table I
MEMBERSHIP SELECTION OVERVIEW
PoW PoR PoCA PoD PoLock PoActivity Ouroboros DPoS AlgoRand
VRF
PoB PoA PoC PoL/PoET PoLocation
Chain Seminal
Chain
Bitcoin
[150]
Repucoin
[221]
PPCoin
[119]
Ethereum
[79, 225]
Tendermint
[40, 123]
–
[28]
Ouroboros
[118]
BitShares
[48]
AlgoRand
[94, 140]
Slimcoin
[196]
Ethereum
[116, 156]
Permacoin
[142]
Intel Ledger*
[112]
Platin
[182]
Assumptions
Trust None None None None None None None None None None Participants
(Authorities)
None Hardware None
Adversary
Computational Computational Stake Stake Stake Stake /
Computational
Stake Stake Stake Stake Traditional Space Traditional Traditional
Properties
Openness Permissionless Permissionless Permissionless Permissionless Permissioned Permissionless Permissionless Permissionless Permissionless Permissionless Permissioned Permissionless Permissionless Permissionless
Selection
Approach
Memory /
Hash Power
Past
Contribution
Coin Age Coins
Deposited
Coins Locked Coins Held,
Online
Balance Votes Balance Coins Burnt Elected
Authority
Storage Number of
CPUs
GPS Location,
Nearby Peers
Incentive
Reward
3 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 7 † 3 7 3 3 3
Incentive
Punish-
ment
7 3 7 3 3 3 7 3‡ 3 7 7# 3 7 3
* Intel’s Ledger was later HyperLedger Sawtooth [111]
† AlgoRand reward based incentive mentioned as future work in the paper [94].
‡ DPoS punishment is that the malicious node will lose trust in the community and be voted out.
# There is no incentive mechanism paired with PoA, but an intrinsic reputation to uphold.
8Proof-of-Work’s strength lies in its ability to provide a
mechanism for validity to a seemingly unlimited, unknown set
of nodes which is necessary for this blockchain context. This
quality has seen Proof-of-Work integrated as the backbone for
other hybrid blockchains [19, 120, 164, 221].
Key Concept: The core concept of Proof-of-Work is
proving validity through work. This allows for a distributed
system to provide a validity check, as an aspect of scalability,
to a large number of nodes whilst also adding resilience against
Sybil attacks. In the blockchain context, a valid block proposal
from a node must encapsulate the proof showing they have
worked for some cost.
Proof-of-Work utilizes the process of solving the puzzle to
express membership selection. If a node wishes to participate
in the proposal of a block in the consensus, it must find
a solution prior to learning of any other blocks that have
been proposed for that given index. The membership selection
accepts any number of nodes as long as they have provided a
correct solution.
To produce a valid block with Proof-of-Work, as depicted
in Figure 2, a miner repeatedly submits a chosen nonce
along with the predecessor block hash, the transaction root
hash, and other metadata to a hashing function. The output
produced is then compared against the difficulty threshold to
determine its validity. The difficulty threshold, dependent upon
the blockchain, is directly proportional to the number of hashes
in expectation to be performed to find a valid solution, as well
as acting as a delay between proposals.
Weaknesses: Although Proof-of-Work achieves its goal for
blockchain membership selection, it is hindered by a number
of limitations. The process of mining required to solve the
Proof-of-Work puzzle requires large amounts of computation,
resulting in high resource and energy consumption. The rising
difficulty to maintain a constant block proposal time results
in increasing costs for running a miner, heavily impacting the
scalability and future operation of the blockchain.
The cost of computation is directly proportional to the
increasing difficulty. Finding a valid solution to the Proof-of-
Work puzzles is a lengthy process, both allowing for fairness in
computational cost as well as giving the network the chance to
disseminate the information of the latest block before a forked
block is found. The inherent delays in proposals relate directly
to a weakness of Proof-of-Work in mainstream blockchains,
as it must cater for a seemingly unknown network size as well
as large amounts of hashing power.
Proof-of-Work assumes the distribution of the hashing
power, where the honest nodes control the majority. However,
there are many plausible attacks proposed against Proof-
of-Work where an adversary can gain control of hashing
power, or manipulate the node’s connections to perform double
spending.
Goals and Assumptions: Proof-of-Work strives to provide
membership selection in an open, permissionless environment,
where all nodes are freely able to join or participate. Proof-of-
Work ties the probability of membership selection to the hash
power of the node, assuming that an increase in hash power
requires an increase of cost. The computational adversary
assumptions made by Proof-of-Work follow this, where the
majority of the computational power of the network will be
owned by honest nodes, where the probability of selecting an
adversary multiple times in a row is low.
For nodes to be incentivized, Proof-of-Work is often ac-
companied by a reward structure that rewards the nodes for
their work, as seen in Bitcoin [150], or Ethereum [78] with
the block rewards.
1) Proof-of-Work Variants
1.1) CPU-bound Proof-of-Work
Bitcoin [150] was the first mainstream blockchain, which
introduced the Proof-of-Work algorithm for cryptocurrency.
The design in bitcoin was heavily influenced by HashCash [36]
together with Dai’s B-Money [61]. The HashCash crypto-
graphic puzzle requires a node to find the solution by re-
peatedly putting a nonce through a pseudorandom function
with a SHA-1 hash. The Bitcoin Proof-of-Work deviates by
requiring the pseudorandom function to produce a SHA-
256 hash, the input is the combination of the nonce and
the new block hash. The CPU-bound functions are directly
related to the calculation speed of the hardware. Modern
“Application-Specific Integrated Circuit” (ASIC) devices, such
as the Antminer R4 [1] were designed to surpass ordinary
computer hashes per unit of money. This provides a major
advantage to the owners that performed the Proof-of-Work
CPU-bound mining. The introduction of the ASIC miners in
the Bitcoin blockchain have heavily influenced the market,
and since have dominated the mining due to the advantages
provided. From the introduction of CPU-bound Proof-of-Work
in Bitcoin, it has been implemented in most major mainstream
blockchains, such as Ethereum and Litecoin.
To create a solution for the CPU-bound Proof-of-work, the
miner batches a number of transactions and creates a Merkle
tree [138] from the transaction hashes. The miner knows
the global threshold, or difficulty, the latest block and the
transactions. They then select a nonce and apply a pseudo-
random function to the new block of transactions. The higher
the difficulty is, the more leading zero is required in the hash
value of a valid block. Table II depicts the relationship between
difficulty, target and the number of expected hashes. The target
is the number that the block hash must be lower than, and as
shown the number of leading zeroes increases with increasing
difficulty, which requires more expected effort to solve. We
refer readers to [33] for a detailed explanation.
1.2) Memory-bound Proof-of-Work
In 2005, Dwork et al. [70] further studied the concept of
memory-bound proof of work for preventing email spam. To
cope with the influx of ASIC miners that dominate the node
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THE RELATION BETWEEN DIFFICULTY AND THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF HASHES. AS THE DIFFICULTY INCREASES, THERE IS AN OBSERVABLE INCREASE
IN THE NUMBER OF LEADING 0’S IN THE TARGET, SO A VALID BLOCK MUST HAVE A VALUE LOWER THAN THE TARGET.
Difficulty Expected Number of Hashes Approximate Target
1 4.295e+09 0x00000000FFFF00000000000000000000...
100 4.295e+11 0x00000000028F5999999999A000000000...
1000 4.295e+12 0x00000000004188F5C28F5C2800000000...
10000 4.295e+13 0x0000000000068DB22D0E560400000000...
1000000 4.295e+15 0x00000000000010C6E6D9BE4CD7000000...
100000000 4.295e+17 0x000000000000002AF2F2D14354120000...
1000000000000 4.295e+21 0x00000000000000000119787E99468E30...
hash power, memory-bound Proof-of-Work algorithms [17, 31,
70] are adapted by blockchains. In particular, the memory-
bound Proof-of-Work, also known as egalitarian Proof-of-
Work, relies on random access to slow memory rather than
computational hashing power, emphasizes a dependency on
latency. This makes the performance bound by memory-access
speed rather than hashing power. Therefore, this provides the
system with resilience to ASIC miners and fast memory-on-
chip devices.
Following the success of Proof-of-Work in cryptocurren-
cies, but seeing the disadvantage of ASIC miners, the Equi-
Hash [31] algorithm was adopted to memory-bound Proof-of-
Work. The CryptoNote [204] as well as ZeroCash [190] both
adopt the memory bound proof-of-work in the concept of a
cryptocurrency.
2) Proof-of-Reputation
Proof-of-Reputation [221] was proposed to extend Proof-of-
Work to mitigate the risks deriving from the ability to quickly
gain computational power, which are at the root of bribery,
or flash attacks [38]. Rather than using instantaneous min-
ing power to select members, Proof-of-Reputation considers
node’s integrated power. In fact, it is calculated using the total
amount of valid work a miner has contributed to the system,
over the regularity of that work over the entire period of time
during which the system has been active. Hence the name,
and the physical bound on power growth rate. When a miner
deviates from the system specifications, the miner’s reputation,
and hence its voting power, will lower in consequence of
this negative contribution. This prevents a powerful malicious
miner from attacking the system repeatedly without significant
consequences, as can occur in the PoW-based systems.
In this way, an adversary can only be successful after
gaining sufficient reputation, requiring costly investment over
time. Thus, it can tolerate an attacker who controls a majority
of mining power for a short time period. In addition, the
node’s reputation drops to zero as soon as an attack is detected,
meaning an adversary can only launch this attack at one time
before having to rebuild reputation. Therefore, any bribes or
rented computational power require costly time investments,
lowering the economical incentive for the adversary to launch
the attack, further mitigating the risk of this attack occurring.
B. Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
Proof-of-Work’s major impediments include the extremely
high resource consumption to produce a block as well as
the low throughput of transactions per second [49, 93]. Ef-
forts have been made to pursue new mechanisms that can
provide similar guarantees for a permissionless environment
whilst improving on the fall-backs of Proof-of-Work. The first
noted proposal on a stake-based voting system was through
Wei Dai’s b-money [61] in 1998, where it mentions users’
voting on included transactions, staking money for dispute
resolution. The concept of Proof-of-Stake in blockchain was
first proposed in a Bitcoin community forum [169] in 2011
to provide quicker and more definite transaction confirmation
through a virtual mining mechanism. The main idea of Proof-
of-Stake is that the consensus participants are required to
deposit something of value at stake, and this deposit will be
taken away if the node is found to be acting incorrectly.
The virtual mining not only provides an environmentally
friendlier blockchain system, by saving the overall energy
consumption when compared to PoW, but also significantly
improves the throughput as blocks can be appended and
committed to the chain faster.
The concept of Proof-of-Stake provides the flexibility to
be implemented in a variety of ways. Each implementation
calculates the user’s stake differently and imposes different
incentive mechanisms to promote node behavior.
Key Concept: The primary motivation behind Proof-of-
Stake is to mitigate the energy waste caused by the block
production process in Proof-of-Work. The core concept lies
in a node proving validity by staking assets, replacing the
hashing to solve a cryptographic puzzle with a stake-based
selection, while still preserving the permissionless nature of
the blockchain. The stake is either taken from their current
balance, or, is locked or deposited by the shareholder. The
voting power of the node can be proportionally mapped to the
stake they have issued. Figure 3 presents the Proof-of-Stake
calculations.
“Nothing at Stake” is a well known attack on Proof-of-Stake
systems, where stakeholders vote for all possible proposals by
using the same stake. Since the voting will lead to an eventual
block decision, the stakeholders will not lose any assets but
gain profit, acting as an incentive to behave in this way. We
will discuss more about such attacks in Section VII. To prevent
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Figure 3. Proof-of-Stake flow.
such an attack, designs include punishments that result in asset
loss upon detection of a stakeholder’s malicious behavior.
The Proof-of-Stake core concept has been adapted into a
number of different membership selection attributes. The goal
of the membership selection is to filter the nodes to form a
committee to participate in consensus, and can assign a weight
to the node’s vote proportional to the amount of stake held.
Weaknesses: Whilst Proof-of-Stake mitigates the energy
usage tied to Proof-of-Work, it is prone to a number of
inherent weaknesses. The outstanding issue with Proof-of-
Stake is the increased potential of centralization and the
concerns of governance. The distribution of assets, as well as
people’s willingness to stake their assets, greatly influence the
membership selection and could lead to a small subset of nodes
being in a position of power for the entire system operation.
To solve this problem, some Proof-of-Stake implementations
utilize frequent membership changes and integrate randomness
so the committee changes and a larger pool of nodes is used.
However, this is still greatly impacted by the use of incentive
mechanisms [83].
Proof-of-Stake, while satisfying the requirements of mem-
bership selection, still suffers from a number of attacks. We
defer the discussion of attacks to Section VII.
Goals and Assumptions: All Proof-of-Stake implemen-
tations share some common goals and assumptions. Members
are selected through stake calculations using balances, deposits
or votes. To increase the probability of selection, nodes
obtain or deposit more stake. However, in some cases such
as Delegated Proof-of-Stake [48], the nodes are selected by
being voted in, where the votes are weighted proportionally to
balance. Proof-of-Stake assumes that there is a limited amount
of resources for a node to stake, and gaining the resource
requires time or significant cost.
The various implementations provide incentives by reward-
ing, or punishing, behavior and participation. Nodes that are
selected are often rewarded through transaction fees or block
rewards. However, Proof-of-Stake is often accompanied by
punishment; when a node is found guilty of misbehavior it
loses the stake that it has deposited, or owns.
Similar to Proof-of-Work, Proof-of-Stake assumes that an
adversary does not control large portions of the stake, that the
stake follows a distribution that allows for the honest nodes
to be selected with higher probability than the adversary.
1) Deposit based
Deposit Based implementations of Proof-of-Stake allow any
node to deposit stake to have the chance to be selected
as a member. The nodes have a choice to increase their
probability of selection by depositing more stake, and vise-
versa. Existing deposit based implementations include proof-
of-lock and proof-of-deposit, as follows.
1.1) Proof-of-Lock
Tendermint’s [123] implementation of Proof-of-Stake requires
nodes to “lock” or “freeze” coins as stake and if found to act
maliciously, the frozen assets are removed. The membership
selection selects the nodes that have frozen coins to be part of
the consensus group, where their voting weight is proportional
to the amount of coins they have frozen as a ratio to total
amount of frozen coins. This is effective against the “nothing
at stake” attack, as the malicious behavior will result in direct
loss of deposited coins.
1.2) Proof-of-Deposit
Similar to Proof-of-Lock, the Proof-of-Deposit as imple-
mented in Ethereum’s original Proof-of-Stake [79] proposal,
requires nodes to deposit a selected amount of coins. The
blockchain keeps track of a set of nodes that have deposited
their coins and randomly selects members from this set to
form groups for the consensus. Dependent upon the imple-
mentation [225], the number of selected nodes is different, i.e.,
a single node is selected if the chain-based implementation
is chosen, or, several nodes are selected if the BFT-style
implementation is used.
2) Balance Based
Alternative to the deposit-based implementations, balance-
based implementations calculate stake using the node’s current
account balance, giving no choice in the amount of asset staked
by a node. However, some implementations allow nodes to
present their stake when they wish to be selected, whereas
others assume the entire set of nodes are willing to participate
in the membership selection.
2.1) Proof-of-Coin-Age
Proof-of-Stake allows for anyone to quickly gain assets and
utilize them as stake, which could have adverse effects on the
system stability. To prevent instantaneous stake gain, Peer-
Coin, or PPCoin [119], implements Proof-of-Stake through
Proof-of-Coin-Age, which calculates the stake based on bal-
ance multiplied by the length of time a node has held that coin
for. If the coin is ever traded, the elapsed time is reset to 0 and
the stake is lost. This provides a disincentive for adversarial
behavior as there is now a required time investment, proving
to be costly.
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2.2) Proof-of-Activity
Although instantaneous stake gain is a challenge faced by
Proof-of-Stake, many implementations do not require explicit
safeguards to provide resilience against powerful actors. Proof-
of-Activity [28] selects “lucky” nodes which must be online
to participate and get rewarded. This approach utilizes Proof-
of-Work where a miner creates an empty block header to
randomly derive N Satoshi’s6 amongst all coins in existence.
The Proof-of-Activity’s Follow-the-Satoshi is then invoked to
select the owners of the selected Satoshi. The owner of this
Satoshi is a stakeholder chosen to propose the next block. All
stakeholders verify the empty block header to verify if they
are the chosen stakeholder and sign the empty block. Once a
stakeholder can verify that N − 1 signatures have signed the
empty block header, the stakeholder creates a wrapped block
that extends the empty block header, adding the transactions
and N valid signatures. Once the block has been accepted, the
transaction fees are shared between the original miner of the
empty block and the N stakeholders that signed.
2.3) AlgoRand’s VRF
Previous approaches to Proof-of-Stake may be vulnerable to
an adversary determining consensus members prior to the
group creation, which could lead to a Denial-of-Service attack
against the consensus and prevent block signing. To prevent
this, AlgoRand’s [94, 140] Proof-of-Stake implementation
randomizes a new subset of members for each step of block
commitment using a Verifiable Random Function (VRF). This
implementation provides a unique feature, where only the
nodes who are selected for the next consensus step know
that they are selected, while other nodes can only verify
this membership selection result afterwards. The use of VRF
prevents an adversary from predicting the set of members
chosen for the next step of committing a block. AlgoRand
measures stake based on the amount of currency held by an
entity. Each member is randomly selected, with voting power
proportional to the amount of stake owned.
2.4) Ouroboros
Similar to AlgoRand, Ouroboros [118]7 applies a lottery-like
method for membership selection. In particular, the set of
current members for the consensus run a multi-party coin-
flip to generate a uniformly random string. This string is then
used to randomly derive the leader for the current epoch as
well as the set of members for the next epoch.
3) Delegated Proof-of-Stake
Delegated Proof-of-Stake [2, 34, 35, 129] (DPoS) provides
a democratic, vote-based membership selection. The Stake-
holders, nodes that hold coins, vote on nodes to become
6A “Satoshi” is the lowest value of currency in the Bitcoin blockchain.
7A version of Ouroboros is presented in [63] which applies the “semi-
synchronous” network model.
Figure 4. Proof-of-Authority flow.
Delegates for specified intervals. In some implementations,
such as Lisk [129], the nodes are assigned a voting weight
proportional to the amount of coins held. The Delegates are
responsible for block production in the entire system, forming
the consensus committee and signing blocks to be appended to
the chain. To incentivize participation, Delegates are rewarded
with block rewards or transaction fees.
BitShares [2] was the original Delegated Proof-of-Stake
system to be implemented. The concept of “voting through
transactions” was first discussed in the forums [48] and was
later developed. Since BitShares, a number of DPoS systems
have been implemented; Lisk [8], Steem [11], and EOS [6]
are major examples.
4) Proof-of-Burn (PoB)
Proof-of-Burn [198] acts as an alternative to Proof-of-Work
and is built upon the primitives of Proof-of-Stake. Initially
discussed in the BitcoinTalk forum [199], the concept was pro-
posed to rival Proof-of-Stake to provide something “difficult”
for all to do. At the time it was proposed, “staking” in Proof-
of-Stake only locked currency, in which a node could withdraw
and their currency would still circulate. To prevent “burning
coins” being effected by potential chain reorganization, the
Proof-of-Burn specification outlines that the burning of coins
should happen a number of blocks prior. The initial concept
of burning coins was proposed as a way to transition between
cryptocurrencies [176, 177].
Slimcoin [196], influenced by Bitcoin [150] and PP-
Coin [119], implemented Proof-of-Burn alongside Proof-of-
Work as a mechanism to mitigate some of the requirements
of powerful hardware. Proof-of-Work blocks are produced as
in Bitcoin, whereas the Proof-of-Burn blocks are created by
burning a threshold of coins, where the threshold is a function
of the difficulty of the Proof-of-Work block as well as the
number of coins burnt by the network. Proof-of-Burn blocks
are only able to appear after a Proof-of-Work block has been
mined. This makes Proof-of-Burn applicable to permissionless
systems, as it inherits the same guarantees and properties as
Proof-of-Work with the added benefits of combined Proof-of-
Stake and Proof-of-Burn.
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C. Proof-of-Authority (PoA)
Proof-of-Authority was initially proposed as an addition
to the Ethereum blockchain [116, 156] for testnet8 usage,
which was a response to the risks with Proof-of-Work in this
context. The core of Proof-of-Authority is that only chosen,
trusted nodes are able to mint new blocks [20]. Although
this centralizes the overall membership of the blockchain, the
usage is suitable for small networks and testnets.
Key Concept: Proof-of-Authority was proposed to main-
tain a blockchain with minimal waste of energy and primarily
focused for the testing network context. The core require
Authorities that are chosen to verify and produce blocks for
the blockchain. For each round, or epoch, a leader or subset
of the authorities are chosen to produce the blocks that are
proposed to extend the chain. The authority nodes are agreed
upon in the configuration of the blockchain. A depiction of
this can be found in Figure 4.
Weaknesses: Although Proof-of-Authority requires Au-
thorities to be chosen as part of the blockchain configura-
tion, there is a selected leader for each round. If the leader
exhibits malicious behavior, there are cases where they are
able to censor and produce invalid blocks. However, in some
implementations the leader can be effectively removed as an
authority if this behavior is observed and voted upon by the
other authorities.
Goals and Assumptions: To provide membership selection
in this environment, Proof-of-Authority variants require pre-
selected nodes to form the authority committee, and thus,
the consensus committee. From this committee, a leader is
selected based on calculations of time [156] or blocks [116].
The network is therefore placing trust in the authorities to
create valid blocks and progress the blockchain. Although this
membership selection has a committee of “chosen” members,
there is no explicit incentive reward or punishment, rather an
implied reputation for the nodes running as the authorities to
maintain their authority position as well as their status in the
community.
1) Aura
Aura [156] is the Proof-of-Authority implemented by the
Parity Ethereum client [181] and progresses in rounds. Out of
the trusted entities, one is the chosen leader of the round who
proposes, or “seals” by signing, blocks to the other members.
Each round a leader is expected to propose a block, if there is
no transaction available then an empty block is proposed. In
the case that the block proposed is invalid, the trusted entities
form a vote to kick the malicious leader.
8A testnet is a blockchain network that runs the blockchain but is used
primarily for testing and has no financial value. It reflects the same charac-
teristics as the main blockchain network, but can often be seen with changed
consensus, smaller difficulty or quicker block times.
2) Clique
Alternatively, Clique [116] is the Proof-of-Authority imple-
mented by the Go Ethereum client [178] (Geth). Similar to
Aura, Clique progresses in epochs and has a leader for an
epoch. However, to minimize the threat of a malicious leader,
Clique PoA allows more than one Authority to propose a
block, specifically A − (A/2 + 1) where A is the number
of Authorities. Each epoch elects a new leader, and each
Authority is limited to proposing every A/2 + 1 blocks.
Figure 5. Proof-of-Capacity flow.
D. Proof-of-Capacity (PoC)
Similar to the motivation behind Proof-of-Stake, Proof-of-
Capacity aims to reduce the amount of wasted resources on
the blockchain by utilizing the resources that would be used
for block production.
As mentioned previously, Proof-of-Work has resulted in an
observable increase in the investment of computing hardware,
through the renting of cloud computing, or, the purchasing of
specialized hardware for mining. As a consequence, a drastic
change to the mining process may cause the hardware to
rapidly depreciate in value. The repercussions of such depre-
ciation could see the loss of adoption in the new membership
selection.
Proof-of-Capacity, otherwise known as Proof-of-
Retrievability [114, 142] or Proof-of-Space [73, 159],
provides a use for the hardware running the blockchain
so that the block production process is not wasted. The
process for block production utilizes hardware storage
which is then used to maintain the blockchain, rather than
wasting resources on useless computing work. The proposed
membership selection requires a node to prove validity
through storing and retrieving shards of a given file. Once
the node has successfully accessed the storage and delivered
the file, the node has not only proven validity, but also
aided in the operation of the blockchain as the stored
files are part of the blockchain itself. This process allows
for the blockchain to be stored and sharded amongst the
entire network, reducing the overall replication required, but
maintaining enough redundancy to be fully decentralized.
By doing so, information can be accessed at any given
time while minimizing the storage costs for the blockchain.
The implementation has been adapted to a number of
blockchains, such as SpaceMint [159], Permacoin [142] and
BurstCoin [91].
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However, a major issue with proving validity through capac-
ity is the impact of cloud infrastructure and the ease of provid-
ing largely scalable storage. To oppose this, implementations
were designed to require fast access to storage, where the cost
of outsourcing impacts the node’s ability to participate. This
mitigates the risk of an adversary purchasing large amounts
of cloud storage to overcome the network for a short period
of time.
Key Concept: The core focus of Proof-of-Capacity was
to re-purpose hardware that was used for Proof-of-Work,
avoiding the waste of computational and electrical resources.
The main concept for this membership selection is that a node
proves validity by storing important information and showing
they can retrieve it at a later point in time. This provides
motivation for a number of implementations that use the
block creation process to aid the operation of the blockchain.
By sharding information amongst nodes successfully, the
blockchain storage can be decentralized whilst minimizing the
number of full replications. A figure presentation of Proof-of-
Capability is shown in Figure 5. Similar to the computation of
Proof-of-Work, storage space is used to construct a proof of
validity allowing a node to propose a block to the consensus.
Weaknesses: The variants of Proof-of-Capacity suffer from
the advances of technology. The foundation is that space is
utilized as an aspect of stake, a node provides storage space
for the power to create blocks. However, the advances in cloud
providers and large companies reveal an increasing possibility
of centralization and monopolization in the mining process.
Goals and Assumptions: To provide membership selection
in a permissionless environment, the variants of Proof-of-
Capacity utilize storage space which also acts as a proof that
the node is valid. For a node to be selected, it must perform a
function on it’s storage space, committing space or retrieving
information, which generates the proof similar to that of Proof-
of-Work. To increase the probability of selection, a node
can increase its storage space which has an assumed cost.
However, to act as a disincentive for cloud-based solutions,
the proofs employ mechanisms to ensure nodes can only have
local storage. This is enforced by taking data access time into
consideration, and nodes access to remote cloud storage will
lose its advantage in the mining process. Nodes are rewarded
for successful selection and proposal with freshly minted
coins, which also acts as an incentive to continue to commit
storage space. In SpaceMint [159], “punishment transactions”
allow misbehaving nodes to be punished and their rewarded
coins revoked.
1) Proof-of-Retrievability
Proof-of-Retrievability was first proposed for storing large
files in a distributed archive in 2007 [114], which was later
adapted into the blockchain context through Permacoin [142]
in 2014. Generating a proof of validity requires a node to
prove it has access to selected files. A valid proof provided by
a node shows that the node has a copy of the associated file.
Figure 6. TEE-based flow.
To achieve a successful distributed archive, the system needs
to incentivize storing files locally, away from cloud-based
solutions. Proof-of-Retrievability employs this by requiring the
consensus member to create a block through local random
access to segments of files. In PermaCoin, the payment private
key is integrated into the puzzle solution, so the solution must
be created with access to this file. In addition to this, and
as a further disincentive for cloud-based storage, the solution
requires frequent random and non-precomputable access to
storage. Thus, in comparison to storing files locally, a node
outsourcing storage will have a delay in creating a valid proof.
2) Proof-of-Space
Similarly, nodes in Proof-of-Space [73] prove that they have
committed dedicated storage space to the system. This concept
was later adapted into SpaceMint [159]. To create a block
and to be selected in the SpaceMint, each node creates a
transaction committing dedicated storage space, and ties the
commitment to its public key. Once the transaction is formed,
the node computes a proof using the Proof-of-Space algorithm
by taking the hash value of the last block as input and
outputting not only the proof of space, but also a “quality”
of the proof. The quality of the proof determines whether the
node will be selected to propose a new block.
E. TEE-Based
With technological advancements in hardware, new alterna-
tives were made possible to be used in blockchain systems.
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a secure space of a
trusted hardware. It guarantees that code running inside will
honestly follow the pre-defined policies and algorithms. The
concepts of Trusted Execution Environments were originally
heavily influenced by the ARM TrustZone [175]. From this,
many major hardware manufacturers, such as AMD [174] and
Intel [110] provide Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs).
TEEs allow for trust to be placed on the hardware running
on a node, allowing algorithms that use randomness and
waiting time to be utilized. This places stronger assumptions
on the system, but allows for a range of different techniques
to be explored, resulting in overall improved performance.
However, although the technology provides great guarantees
for running secure code, it is slowly being integrated with
average consumer hardware. In addition, it requires users to
trust the manufacturers of the trusted components.
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Key Concept: Members can be selected by using a random
that utilizes the trusted execution environments on hardware.
Rather than wasting work or requiring nodes to sacrifice
funds, TEE-based membership selection selects nodes with
a probability proportional to the number of TEEs that node
controls. This means a node is able to increase the probability
of selection by purchasing more hardware devices. One critical
aspect of TEE hardware is that each hardware device has a
unique identification, meaning each node’s hardware device
can only be used once. This prevents a node from spoofing
the number of hardware devices they are in control of.
Weaknesses: The prominent weakness in TEE-based mem-
bership selection is the reliance on specialized hardware.
Although Trusted Execution Environments are manufactured
to provide guarantees, other factors may influence the trust
placed in the hardware. Trusting hardware requires placing
trust in the vendors that supply the hardware, which inevitably
can lead to centralization or monopolization through vendors.
However, even if monopolization or centralization provide
negligible impact, the inherent trust in the hardware may prove
fatal. TEEs, although manufactured and developed correctly,
may suffer from a number of flaws or attacks [96, 113, 146,
194, 214], where an adversary can bias the operation of the
blockchain.
Goals and Assumptions: TEE-based membership selection
techniques, such as Proof-of-Elapsed-Time and Proof-of-Luck,
place trust into hardware to aid with the selection of members.
This allows for lottery-like algorithms to be used to randomly
generate data, which is then used to determine whether a
node is selected. The function to generate the randomization
is run in the trusted environment, so the algorithm can assume
that the output will be random. To increase the selection
probability, the node will need to purchase more specialized
hardware with TEEs. Figure 6 presents the abstract idea of
this class of membership selection.
Proof-of-Elapsed-Time and Proof-of-Luck are often paired
with reward-based incentive mechanisms, where winning pro-
posals are rewarded with freshly minted coins or transaction
fees.
1) Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET)
Intel ltd. proposes Proof-of-Elapsed-Time [54, 112], which
relies on secure instruction execution to achieve the features
provided by PoW-based systems, while not consuming as
much energy as PoW. This project was later implemented as a
HyperLedger project, called “HyperLedger Sawtooth” [111].
Proof-of-Elapsed-Time is performed by each node in the
blockchain network executing a ‘sleep’ function for a random
amount of time. The first node to wake from the sleep gets
elected as the leader to propose the new block. The time to
sleep is a random number generated using Intel’s Software
Guard Extensions (SGX) [110], which allows applications
to run trusted code in a protected environment, this in turn
ensures that the randomness of the sleep time generated for
each machine is trusted randomness.
Figure 7. Proof-of-Location flow.
2) Proof-of-Luck
As an alternative method, Proof-of-Luck [145] proposes a
similar concept in which nodes perform computation inside a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), such as Intel’s SGX, to
generate a random winner for block proposal. The generation
of the random winner occurs as all nodes execute the block
proposal code inside the TEE producing a number that is com-
pared against all other proposed numbers. The core element of
this mechanism lies in the trust of the TEE to guarantee that
all code run will produce valid expected output. The Proof-of-
Luck also utilizes sub-proofs to prove that a node has provided
the correct solution.
F. Proof-of-Location
The growing use of mobile and IoT devices has influenced
the introduction of the blockchain to these platforms [67,
68, 103, 121, 184]. However, the major blockchains utilizing
Proof-of-Work based membership requires computationally
intensive tasks, impractical for the low-powered devices. The
Proof-of-Location [39, 182] aims to utilize the dynamic loca-
tion of mobile devices to create and verify proofs of a given
device’s location. This can be used for signing transactions,
interacting with blockchain contracts or for pure verification
of location.
Proof-of-Location [39] heavily relies on close peers to vali-
date the location of another. Originally proposed for collusion
resistance [228], the Proof-of-Location utilizes the geographic
location of the node that is then signed by other nodes to
verify that it is correct, as depicted in Figure 7. The location
verification is required to stop geographic location spoofing,
which is done through location requests as well as utilizing
low-range communication channels.
Key Concept: The Proof-of-Location’s core concept is to
utilize the dynamic geographic location of mobile devices to
integrate into the interaction with the blockchain. To mitigate
the risk of spoofed location, some proposals for Proof-of-
Location utilize a range of communication channels [39]
for validation and verification of another node’s location.
Dependent upon implementation, the selection will work via
verification of location, either a node is in a certain loca-
tion [182], or, are able to verify their location with closest
peers [39]. To ensure good behavior, the Proof-of-Location
provides incentives to act good, through reward, as well as
punishment if they are found to falsify the location.
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Weaknesses: Although there are countermeasures to loca-
tion spoofing, collusion amongst players may lead to spoofed
locations being accepted as valid.
Goals and Assumptions: Proof-of-Location aims to pro-
vide a membership selection mechanism9 based of a device’s
geographical location. To do so, the location must be verified
by other nearby devices. This will enable the membership
selection to be applied to a permissionless environment with no
inherent trust required. The combination of both rewards and
punishment act as incentives for the nodes to behave correctly.
V. CONSENSUS
In this section we present an overview of the consensus
mechanisms that have been applied to blockchain systems
today. A summary of the consensus covered in this section
can be found in Table III.
The consensus in the blockchain holds the responsibility
of deciding the next chosen block to be appended to the
chain. This step is vital to the operation of the blockchain
as it produces the blocks that contain the transactions and
state transfers. Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) protocols, also
known as Byzantine Agreement (BA) protocols, were pro-
posed to achieve consensus in the presence of distributed
participants where some may be potentially malicious. This
problem was originally detailed as the Byzantine Generals
Problem [126] in distributed computing systems and has been
thoroughly studied for over 40 years.
The Byzantine Generals Problem: The Byzantine Gener-
als Problem depicts a situation where the Byzantine army is
separated into different units, each commanded by a general.
The army wishes to make an attack on the city, however, the
attack will only succeed if the units are coordinated to attack at
the same time. To prepare a coordinated attack, the generals
must communicate through messengers and decide whether
to attack or retreat. However, one or more generals may be
traitors who will try to intentionally subvert the process so the
loyal generals cannot arrive at a unified plan. The goal is to
have every honest general agreeing on the same decision even
in the presence of traitors.
To illustrate the problem, let the army have 2N+1 generals
in total, and one of them is a traitor. If half of the loyal
generals want to attack, and half want to retreat, the traitor
has the ability to misguide the set of generals to attack or
retreat. This can lead to the situation where N generals attack
and N retreat, fatal for the Byzantine army. This problem
becomes worse as messengers are used for communication
and the traitor may prevent messages from being delivered to
a loyal general, or, by forging a falsified message.
A. Nakamoto’s Consensus
Nakamoto’s Consensus, introduced with Bitcoin, was
the first consensus to be applied in the permissionless
9Proof-of-Location is used in a variety of ways. Some location proofs are
utilized for interaction, others are utilized to share location in a decentralized
context depending on the usage. [39, 67, 182]
blockchain context, and has been adopted by many other
blockchains [130, 190, 216]. The core aspect of Nakamoto’s
consensus is the Longest Chain rule, which is used in the event
that two, or more, blocks had been proposed at the same height
and the chains have progressed in a forked state. The longest
chain states that nodes must select the chain with the highest
block number as the single, canonical chain. The longest chain
is believed to have the most work performed, adhering to the
principle that the strict majority of the network, and therefore
computational power, is owned by honest participants. In the
case two chains have the same length, the nodes perform
work on the first valid block they receive, while rejecting
other conflicting blocks until one branch becomes the longest
branch.
In the context of a permissionless blockchain, Nakamoto’s
consensus only guarantees eventual consistency [210], that is,
if there are no new blocks proposed, all nodes will eventually
see the latest block at the height of the chain. During the time
the blockchain experiences a transient fork and consistency
is not met, Nakamoto’s consensus will provide the fork
resolution eventually reaching a consistent state on all nodes.
Nakamoto’s consensus provides security under the assump-
tion that the strict majority of the network is honest, and when
blocks are propagated through the network prior to any new
proposals. With high block creation speed, more nodes will
propose blocks based on stale information, as the information
has not fully propagated before their proposal is created. This
results in an increasing number of blocks not extending the
“longest chain”, which may have a number of implications
for performance or potential attacks.
The rule of selecting the longest chain as a fork resolution
protocol causes a number of proposals to be wasted. If paired
with Proof-of-Work-based membership selection, then this can
lead to a waste of mining power and, at large, energy, as all
blocks that are not selected on the main branch are considered
“not accepted” [65, 95, 153, 160].
One hindrance to Nakamoto’s Consensus is the reduced
security with frequent block proposals. As the voting power in
the network increases, through node number or otherwise, the
number of possible proposals increases. This resulted in a re-
quirement in Nakamoto’s consensus to have a limited number
of proposals with satisfactory delay between proposals10.
The increased frequency of block proposals presents a prob-
lem for Nakamoto’s consensus, as it is heavily reliant on the
dissemination of blocks prior to any mining. Once the block
creation speed exceeds the propagation time, the probability
of concurrent proposals increases and the honest nodes will
have more conflicting blocks, wasting overall mining power.
At this point, Nakamoto’s consensus will select the longest
chain and as a consequence a number of attacks, such as
double spending, may have a higher success rate without the
required majority voting power.
Goals and Assumptions: Nakamoto’s consensus will op-
erate correctly assuming a synchronous network, as it requires
10Typically, Nakamoto’s consensus is coupled with Proof-of-Work, as in
Bitcoin, and the delay of proposals are adjusted through a dynamically
changed difficulty parameter.
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all nodes to have knowledge of the latest blocks in order to
correctly extend the main chain. Due to this, the consensus
will only terminate given that all blocks for a given height
are seen by all the nodes. In practice, it provides probabilistic
consensus when its time bounds are exceeded as experienced
by the Internet. The probabilistic consensus can be due to
either termination or agreement not being reached as there is
a possibility of unseen chains after sufficient time has elapsed.
The Nakamoto Consensus model can be seen to provide
partial order during time before agreement is met or before
termination is achieved. Once the fork has been resolved,
the common prefix increases. Nakamoto’s consensus fails to
ensure validity, where all correct nodes proposing a block
with a transaction may still decide on an empty block upon
termination of the consensus instance for the given height.
The adversary model employed by Nakamoto’s Consensus
places heavy assumptions on the block proposals, where
the honest nodes produce new proposals quicker than the
adversarial nodes, such that the honest nodes will always be
proposing a longer, valid chain. This can be achieved through
the majority of the voting power resource being owned by the
honest nodes.
B. Ghost
Inherent impediments caused by the longest chain consen-
sus prompted a proposal for a new consensus mechanism.
The Greedy Heaviest Observed Sub-Tree, or GHOST, pro-
tocol [197] was proposed as a new consensus mechanism
for fork resolution in the blockchain, attempting to alleviate
the problems discovered in the longest chain approach. The
conflict-resolution mechanism employed by GHOST utilizes
blocks that are not included on the canonical chain, providing
a mechanism to consider all efforts on the blocks. The chain
selection algorithm iteratively selects the heaviest sub-tree,
rooted at the genesis block, block 0, and building up the correct
chain to the current block.
By including the number of proposed blocks that are not
included in the canonical branch, as a calculation of a sub-
tree’s weight, GHOST provides some resilience to forks oc-
curring in high throughput environments. The main advantage
of GHOST is that it maintains the 50% threshold for attacks at
higher throughput and larger block sizes. The key concept of
GHOST is that the blocks not accepted on the canonical chain
still impact the weight and therefore contribute to the fork-
resolution protocol, providing resilience to some adversary
activity in the case of high throughput.
Goals and Assumptions: GHOST, similar to Nakamoto’s
consensus, requires synchrony to achieve a consensus agree-
ment. Under the conditions where synchrony is not achieved,
it will fail to terminate or reach agreement, as nodes will
be observing stale branches of the chain. During the point
at which no branch is heaviest, GHOST provides a partial
order, as the prefix of blocks is common to all forked branches
until the fork has been resolved. However, GHOST does not
achieve validity in proposals, as empty blocks can still be
considered even though all valid nodes propose blocks with
valid transactions being contained.
The adversary model follows Nakamoto’s consensus, where
the strict majority of the voting power belongs to honest
nodes. This ensures that the heaviest sub-tree has the highest
probability of being created by honest nodes.
Ethereum and GHOST: Computing the entire sub-tree
requires a substantial amount of time and resources, impeding
the progress of the blockchain. Ethereum utilizes a variant of
GHOST, a simplified GHOST protocol for reward11, where each
block specifies an uncle block if it has competing predecessor
blocks of the same height. The simplification comes with the
depth, as the ancestors considered are only in the order of 7
generations, whereas the full version would go the full depth.
C. BFT Protocols
Traditional BFT protocols provide solutions to this problem
through techniques such as the use of signatures, being able
to detect the absence of messages, or otherwise. Given the
context of the blockchain, where a number of nodes may be
acting malicious or experiencing unusual network traffic, BFT
protocols were a suitable selection to achieve consensus.
To utilize BFT protocols in a Bitcoin-like context, three
main problems must be addressed. First, the original mem-
bership selection has been designed for Nakamoto/Ghost-like
consensus, and it cannot be directly applied to the traditional
BFT protocols. If not paired with a cost, this will allow an
attacker to launch Sybil attacks [69] and disrupt the BFT
consensus from reaching agreement or terminating. Secondly,
the set of participants in the Blockchain eligible to participate
in the consensus is generally not fixed, nor predefined. Thirdly,
the participants may join or leave the system at arbitrary times,
therefore the quorum size [134] required for agreement is not
constant. These questions are generally addressed by applying
a membership selection technique.
1) PBFT-based solutions
The Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [52] algo-
rithm achieves consensus through leader-based communication
with three phases. The first phase, pre-prepare, begins with the
leader assigning a sequence number and multicasting to all
other nodes. Once a node receives the pre-prepare, it enters
the prepare phase and muilticasts to all other nodes. If a
node receives 2f prepare messages that match the pre-prepare
message, where f is the number of potentially faulty nodes,
it enters the commit stage and multicasts a commit message.
A message is then committed if a node had received enough
commit messages from 2f + 1 replicas that match the pre-
prepare for the message. The pre-prepare and prepare phase
are used to totally order the messages, whereas the prepare
and commit phases are used to ensure requests that commit
are totally ordered across all nodes.
11Details can be found at https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-
Paper#modified-ghost-implementation
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Table III
CONSENSUS MECHANISMS
Nakamoto Ghost BA? HoneyBadger RepuCoin DBFT Tendermint PeerCensus Solida ByzCoin Thunderella Avalanche HotStuff LibraBFT
Chain Seminal
Chain
Bitcoin
[150]
-
[197]
AlgoRand
[94, 140]
-
[143]
RepuCoin
[221]
RedBelly
[59, 60]
Tendermint
[40, 123]
PeerCensus
[64]
Solida
[19]
ByzCoin
[120]
Thunderella
[164]
AVA
[201]
-
[219]
Libra
[27, 179]
Assumptions
Network Sync Sync Sync Async Partial-Sync Partial-Sync Partial-Sync Partial-Sync Sync Partial-Sync Partial-Sync Sync§ Partial-Sync Partial-Sync
Online
Presence
Online Online Online Online Online Online Online Online Online Online Sleepy Online Online Online
Adversary f ′ <
⌊
N′
2
⌋
* f ′ <
⌊
N′
2
⌋
* f ′ <
⌊
N′
3
⌋
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f ′ ≤
⌊
N′
3
⌋
,
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
?
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f < N
5
¶ f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
f ≤
⌊
N
3
⌋
Goals
Agreement Probabilistic # Probabilistic # Common Coin Common Coin Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Probabilistic # Deterministic Deterministic
Termination Probabilistic # Probabilistic # Deterministic Probabilistic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic † Probabilistic # Deterministic Deterministic
Validity 7 7 7 7 7 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Total
Order
3/7 3/7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3/7 3 3
Partition
Consistency 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7‡ 7 3 3
Availability 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 7 7
f Denotes the number of Byzantine nodes.
f′ Denotes voting power of the adversary
N Denotes the total number of nodes.
N′ Denotes Total voting power.
3 The system provides the associated property.
7 The system does not provide the associated property.
3/7 The system experiences forks resulting in states of total order prefix with tails of unconfirmed blocks.
§ The paper assumes a synchronous network, but conjecture that the results hold in a partially synchronous network. However, the proof is left to future work in the paper [201].
¶ The authors in [201] recommend that system designers select their value of Byzantine threhsold. The value here was an example provided in the paper.
* The adversary model follows that the majority of the voting power is owned by the honest majority. This can translate into “the honest majority produces blocks faster than the adversary”.
# The termination OR agreement can be seen as probabilistic. Discussed in Section VIII.
? With RepuCoin, only the top reputed miners in the committee have voting power, other participants have a reputation score, but have zero voting power before they become a top reputed miner.
† Under optimistic conditions with an honest leader. Under non optimistic conditions and a faulty leader, falls back to Proof-of-Work for the cooldown period.
‡ The Thunderella blockchain utilizes a Hybrid mechanism, which in non-optimal cases can fall back to availability in the presence of a partition.
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In the case that the primary exhibits faulty behavior, or the
replica “timers” expire, PBFT offers a view-change mechanism
that elects a new primary. To perform the view-change, all
replicas will send the VIEW-CHANGE message to all replicas,
which contains the current state. The new primary then sends
the NEW-VIEW message to all replicas to initiate the new view.
To provide BFT to the blockchain, systems such as
PeerCensus [64], ByzCoin [120], and Solida [19] utilize
variants of the PBFT algorithm tailored to their requirements.
Goals and Assumptions: The variants of PBFT explored
in this survey, PeerCensus [64] and ByzCoin [120], exhibit
similar goals and assumptions. Consensus can be reached in
a partially-synchronous environment, where there are strictly
less than a third of the nodes exhibiting Byzantine behavior.
However, Solida [19] assumes a synchronous environment to
ensure that a delta message delay is known a-priori. Agreement
is reached, through the use of signed messages in a leader-
based consensus protocol, however, ByzCoin provides a vari-
ant that uses a two-phase signing scheme to reach agreement.
The termination, that of PBFT, is achieved when the nodes
vote on the proposed block.
PeerCensus’ Consensus: The consensus mechanism em-
ployed by the PeerCensus [64] blockchain is a variant of the
PBFT leader-based consensus mechanism. The ability for a
member to join and leave are managed through a secure group
membership protocol (SGMP) [172], which allows for the
members in the consensus committee to observe any changes
in membership. This provides the knowledge of all members in
the committee, allowing communication between known nodes
and thus can perform the required communication.
To commit a transaction, the transaction must be sent to
the current leader. The leader then performs the PBFT-based
consensus with the current committee. Similarly, blocks are
committed through the committee performing PBFT with
the leader proposing any conflicting blocks and obtaining a
decision from the members on which block is to be decided.
This solves the second and third problems mentioned above.
ByzCoin’s Consensus: ByzCoin [120] improves upon
PeerCensus by altering the consensus and adding scalability
through the use of a collective signing scheme, CoSi [200].
In particular, the consensus committee has a fixed size12, and
any newly elected members replace the oldest member. For
each consensus execution, the committee executes the PBFT
view-change protocol and elects a new leader.
The consensus protocol is a two-phase PBFT protocol which
replaces the PBFT MAC authentication with the collective
signing scheme presented in CoSi [200]. The signing scheme
allows a large set of selected members to efficiently and
collectively commit and produce a signature. This allows for
larger committee sizes to run the consensus, thus improving
scalability in respect to the committee size.
12The size of the consensus committee is implemented as the size of
“window” in [120]
Solida’s Consensus: In Solida [19]13, the consensus is a
variant of PBFT, which is performed by a dynamically config-
ured group of members. Similar to ByzCoin, newly selected
members replace the oldest members in the committee, but
also become the leader until a new leader is elected. A leader
that is unable to make progress is replaced through a similar
mechanism to the PBFT view-change.
Members are selected by ranking non-member miners based
on their solution to the Proof-of-Work puzzle. If two solutions
are found at the same time, the miners are ranked using the
hash value of their solution. However, the selection progress
has preference to select non-member miners.
2) RepuCoin
RepuCoin’s consensus, integrated with the Proof-of-
Reputation as discussed in § A.2, provides a weighted
vote-based consensus. In particular, each member in the
consensus committee is assigned a weight associated with
that member’s reputation. To reach agreement, RepuCoin
requires both sufficient number of votes, and, majority of
collective weight of the votes.
The main novelty of this weighted consensus comes from
the decoupling of mining power and voting power. In par-
ticular, the voting power in RepuCoin is “integrated power”
(i.e. reputation) which represents the total contribution of a
node in the system, rather than the node’s “instantaneous
mining power” (e.g. hashing power in PoW) that can be gained
quickly. So, a newly joined miner may have a lot of computing
power, but it will not have any voting power before it achieves
a contribution threshold that is relative to the contributions
of other miners. In this way, RepuCoin is secure against an
attacker who can even obtain a majority of mining power in
a short time. Also, when detecting malicious behavior of a
node, the reputation of this node will be set to 0. This not
only reduces the incentive of a node attacking the system,
but also prevents a malicious node from repeating the attacks
without any consequence.
RepuCoin did not provide a detailed consensus algorithm,
rather it provides ways to adapt existing secure BFT protocols,
making the design more generic. In particular, one modifica-
tion to make for adapting existing BFT protocols is the change
of views and update of consensus committee. In RepuCoin, at
the end of each epoch, the system enforces view-change and
membership updates. Also, upon detecting crashed committee
member, the system also updates the membership.
Goals and Assumptions: Currently, all proof-of-work
based systems assume that no single attacker can control more
than 50% of the mining power at any time, as otherwise the
attacker can launch 51% attacks to double spend coins. For
example, Ethereum classic has been attacked by 51% attack,
and lost millions of dollars [57, 202].
The main goal of RepuCoin is to tolerate a malicious miner
who may even control a majority of mining power for a time
13This work was previously known as “Solidus: An Incentive-compatible
Cryptocurrency Based on Permissionless Byzantine Consensus”, which was
first available one arXiv.org at Dec 2016.
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period. This goal is achieved by the separation of mining
power and voting power, as previously mentioned. In addition,
RepuCoin provides a higher throughput (about 10K TPS) by
using a parallel chain structure, which we will detail in §VI.
RepuCoin’s leader-based consensus operates using a selec-
tion of miners who hold the highest reputation, which is then
translated into weighted votes in the consensus. The consensus
operates under the assumption of a partially-synchronous
network and can be achieved given that (a) no more than 13 of
selected nodes for running consensus are malicious; and (b)
the honest nodes collectively hold more than 23 of the voting
power in the consensus committee.
3) Thunderella
Thunderella [164] provides a unique consensus for
blockchains in two conditions, the optimistic conditions
and the worst case conditions. In optimal conditions, the
leader is honest and the adversary controls strictly less than
1
4 of the online voting power in each round and can only
corrupt a target node after a certain time delay. In non-optimal
conditions, where the adversary controls strictly less than 12 of
the total voting power, Thunderella resorts to the underlying
blockchain to satisfy the liveness and safety guarantees of
their consensus model.
During optimistic conditions, the consensus is to simply
collect 34 votes from the consensus committee. This provides
a fast, two-round communication consensus for a transac-
tion to be committed. If the leader is seen as dishonest,
and the optimistic conditions are not met, Thunderella falls
back to Nakamoto’s consensus. In particular, miners create
a blockchain with uncommitted transactions. If the leader
is honest, they should commit these transactions within a
defined time period through the optimistic consensus. If this
fails to occur, it provides evidence towards an incorrect
leader and Thunderella falls back for a cool-down period.
The Nakamoto’s consensus ensures consistency of the miners’
views of the blockchain.
Goals and Assumptions: Thunderella aims at eliminating
the complex process of view-change in PBFT, by replacing it
with the Nakamoto consensus. In this way, when the attacker
is less powerful, Thunderella provides a high throughput;
when the attacker is more powerful, then it falls back to the
guarantees of normal Nakamoto consensus.
It assumes a partially-synchronous environment, and pro-
vides deterministic leader-based consensus in the optimal case.
If there is a faulty leader, Thunderella falls back to Nakamoto’s
consensus. The optimistic case of Thunderella requires 34 of
the votes to be collected for a single block, in which only two
communication rounds are needed to commit the block. Else,
similar to the traditional blockchain consensus, 12 of votes must
be from honest members.
The consensus operates like a classical leader-based BFT
consensus. The leader receives transactions and signs with
a sequence number, which is then broadcast to the commit-
tee. Once the committee has received the transaction, they
acknowledge and vote on the transaction, but only one per
sequence number. Once the transaction has gained 34 votes, it
is considered committed. In the case it cannot be committed,
the cool-down period will come into effect and Nakamoto’s
consensus will be utilized.
4) AlgoRand’s BA?
AlgoRand’s [94, 140] BA? provides a vote-based Byzantine
Agreement aimed at providing efficient probabilistic consen-
sus. The members of the consensus committee are chosen
through randomization provided by a blockchain-based com-
mon coin, which is also used in the consensus rounds. The
selection occurs at each new block height, selecting both
members and a leader for the committee.
The common coin is implemented by using the last block of
the blockchain. In particular, leaders and consensus commit-
tees are selected based on the hash value of their signature
on some commonly shared information, including the last
block, the current consensus step number and consensus round
number. The unique element in AlgoRand is that nodes are
only able to see if they are selected and cannot see, or predict,
other node’s participation.
BA? is expected to terminate within 6 rounds. Each BA?
execution consists of two phases. The first reduction phase,
where a block decision is reduced to a binary value, and the
second phase where voting on the binary value is run to reach
consensus, or, reaches a decision on an empty block. Each
phase consists of a number of steps to reach a final agreement.
At each step the node performs local computation to produce
a vote. The votes are then counted and steps progress only if
the threshold of votes is met.
Goals and Assumptions: AlgoRand aims to provide a
balance between scalability, decentralization, and security. In
particular, it aims to prevent an attacker from predicting con-
sensus committee members. This eliminates potential targeted
attacks.
AlgoRand provides blockchain consensus in a synchronous
network. The agreement of the BA? algorithm utilizes a
common coin paired with cryptographic signatures to reach
agreement. The Byzantine Agreement is reached in 6 rounds,
13 worst case, but utilizes a common coin for randomization
if a decision could not be made. The validity of the proposals
requires the message to have a valid signature from the node
in the current sortition, but also ensure that the block seed, a
random seed for a round, is correct for the given round.
Although AlgoRand requires synchrony to reach agreement,
it can achieve safety in periods of weak synchrony where the
network is asynchronous for a bound period of time. The
AlgoRand BA? can provide consensus given that there are
more than two thirds honest nodes.
5) Tendermint
Tendermint [40, 123] provides a leader-based BFT consensus
for the blockchain. The selected nodes form a committee and
take turns proposing a new block for the given height in
rounds. Each round consists of a proposal of a valid block,
voting to decide upon accepting the block, and finally, if more
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than two-thirds of the committee vote to commit the block,
the block gets appended to the blockchain and committed.
The Tendermint consensus requires a locking mechanism to
ensure that a selected node does not double vote for different
blocks at the same height. To ensure this, the selected node is
seemingly locked if they had pre-voted and pre-committed for
a specified block, however, they are able to unlock their vote
if they have witnessed more than two-thirds of the votes for a
block in a given round. The switching of a vote is permitted
to protect liveness, but must be done in a way that it does
not compromise safety, therefore only after two-thirds of the
committee have voted to commit a block.
Goals and Assumptions: Tendermint provides consensus
under the assumption of partial-synchrony, where the honest
nodes control more than 23 of the voting power. The consensus
is deterministic, utilizing increasing timeouts for the proposal
round, but allowing for asynchrony during vote stages. During
the event that the network is partitioned, or more than a third
of the nodes exhibit Byzantine behavior, the network may halt
all-together.
6) HoneyBadger BFT
The HoneyBadger BFT [143], aims at providing blockchain
consensus for permissioned blockchains, where the network is
asynchronous but reliable channels exist between nodes that
guarantee message delivery once a message is placed into the
channel. The execution of the HoneyBadger BFT utilizes a
reduction from multi-value consensus to a binary consensus,
utilizing erasure codes to further improve the efficiency. To
cope with the complete asynchrony, the implementation uses
a common coin for randomization in the consensus.
For each consensus execution, each node of a pre-defined
consensus committee (of size up to 104) randomly selects
a set of uncommitted valid transactions, encrypts it through
a threshold-based encryption scheme, and disseminates it to
all nodes through a reliable broadcast protocol. Each node
produces its part of the decryption share for each received mes-
sage, broadcasts it, and perform the threshold-based decryption
upon receiving f + 1 shares. The successfully decrypted
transactions are considered to be accepted by the consensus
committee, and are sorted in canonical order to place into the
block. Following this, the adversarial model adopted is static
faults, where an adversary is able to control up to f nodes,
where 3f + 1 ≤ N .
Goals and Assumptions: HoneyBadger BFT provides
blockchain consensus in a completely asynchronous network
through the use of a common coin for randomization. Al-
though the network is completely asynchronous, with no
bound on the message delay, there is an assumption that there
is a reliable channel between nodes to guarantee the message
delivery. The common coin provides a high probability that
agreement will be reached. Due to this, the termination is
probabilistic, as the common coin can lead to disagreement.
If less than a third of the members are exhibiting malicious
behavior, then consensus can be achieved.
7) Democratic Byzantine Fault Tolerant (DBFT)
The consensus mechanism proposed by Crain et al. in [59]
provides a deterministic algorithm for Blockchain consensus.
The unique properties of this consensus is that it requires no
leaders, signatures or randomization. However, by sacrificing
liveness, it ensures safety even in the event of arbitrary delays.
Another unique aspect of the Democratic Byzantine Fault
Tolerant (DBFT) consensus is that it performs a union on the
proposed values, allowing for the maximum set of values to
be agreed upon and committed by the consensus committee.
Goals and Assumptions: The DBFT consensus provides
blockchain consensus in a partial synchronous network. It can
provide consensus given the Byzantine nodes are less than
a third of the total consensus nodes, so a decision can be
made with adequate votes. By removing the randomization,
the agreement is deterministic based on the votes received by
the nodes, in turn providing deterministic termination. DBFT
provides validity by providing a union of proposals, such that
if all honest nodes propose valid transactions, the block agreed
in the consensus instance will not be empty.
8) Avalanche
Avalanche [201] introduces a class of leaderless Byzantine
Fault Tolerant consensus protocols. The protocols utilize gos-
sip communication and select subsets of nodes in the network
to converge to a decision. A node uniformly selects nodes
in the network, interacting with the subset of nodes and
gossiping their decision. Once the node has interacted with
the entire network, they can determine the decision based
on the given threshold. Avalanche is built up from Slush, a
non-Byzantine consensus core for metastability, Snowflake, a
Byzantine Fault Tolerant adaptation of Slush, and Snowball,
an adaptation of Snowflake with confidence for switching
decisions. Inspired by Nakamoto Consensus [150], Avalanche
provides probabilistic guarantees with probability 1−, where
 is a security parameter chosen by system. Avalanche utilizes
a DAG structure for transactions and confidence.
Goals and Assumptions: Avalanche is modeled in a syn-
chronous environment, but is conjectured to work in a partial
synchronous environment. The leaderless consensus exhibits
probabilistic guarantees, inspired by Nakamoto’s consensus in
Bitcoin. With these probabilistic guarantees, the consensus has
a preference for availability over consistency, as it will allow
applications to continue to be used and transactions committed
once they reach a certain confidence threshold.
9) HotStuff
HotStuff [219] is a leader-based Byzantine Fault-Tolerant con-
sensus mechanism that builds upon concepts from PBFT [52],
Tendermint [40, 123] and Ethereum’s Casper [46, 188, 225].
HotStuff presents a three phase consensus, with PREPARE,
PRE-COMMIT and COMMIT phases. The three phases are
required for liveness as it allows nodes to change their initial
decision and not lock [195]. In each phase, the leader collects
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messages, waiting for N −f votes, where N is the number of
nodes participating in the consensus and f is the number of
Byzantine faults, before moving to the next phase. By moving
to the next phase as soon as the leader collected enough
messages, it allows for progress to follow the delay of the
network rather than arbitrary waits. This is done by using
Quorum Certificates (QC), a concept of signed data containing
the N − f votes to show proof of message reception as well
as progression.
HotStuff also presents a linear (O (N)) view-change mech-
anism, used to elect new leaders [219]. The reduction in
complexity allows the view-change to be integrated as part
of the normal operation with minimal impact to the overall
performance.
Chained HotStuff: Vitalik Buterin proposed a Casper [46]
message reduction to improve efficiency by changing prepare
and commit to simple votes. Similarly, HotStuff proposes an
improvement by allowing a view-change to happen on every
PREPARE phase, reducing the number of messages required for
a single round (r), as well as pipelining the commit process.
When collecting the votes for the PREPARE phase, the Quorum
Certificate (N − f votes) formed is passed to the next round
(r+1) leader. The next leader initiates the PREPARE for their
view, but also includes the PRE-COMMIT for the previous
round r − 1 as well as the COMMIT phase for round r − 2.
Goals and Assumptions: HotStuff presents consensus with
partial synchrony. The consensus tolerates strictly less than a
third of the participants exhibiting Byzantine behavior. The
protocol utilizes a core of three-phases to come to agreement,
not requiring any randomization or coin flipping and thus
provides deterministic agreement and termination. HotStuff
utilizes timeouts to progress, however, if the threshold of
messages arrive earlier than the timeout, it will interrupt and
progress without having to wait for the timeout to be fulfilled.
LibraBFT: LibraBFT [27] is a blockchain-based Byzantine
Fault Tolerant consensus which builds upon HotStuff [219] and
is at the heart of Facebook’s Libra blockchain [179]. LibraBFT
extends HotStuff by requiring a new leader for each block
proposal. The leader proposes a block, which is then voted
upon by the remainder of the committee. Once the leader
has collected enough votes (N − f ), they form a Quorum
Certificate with the votes and append the block and certificate
to the blockchain. A new leader is then chosen for the next
round.
The LibraBFT also extends HotStuff through a reconfig-
urable consensus committee per epoch, where membership
selection can be utilized, such as a VRF [140] as mentioned
in the proposal.
VI. STRUCTURE
In this section we present overviews and graphical repre-
sentations of proposed structural changes to the blockchain.
The Bitcoin blockchain originally featured a single, canonical
chain with homogeneous block types. New proposals, how-
ever, provide a variety of new block types and structures that
provide improvements and alternative ways that the blockchain
can operate.
A. New block types
Some proposals focus improvements primarily on block
types. By moving away from homogeneous blocks and adding
new block functionality, new opportunities arise for improve-
ments to the blockchain.
1) Bitcoin-NG
Bitcoin-NG [84] aims at improving upon Bitcoin’s throughput
by utilizing heterogeneous block types. In particular, Bitcoin-
NG introduces two types of blocks, namely Keyblocks and
Microblocks. Keyblocks are produced through Bitcoin’s Proof-
of-Work, taking several minutes to produce a block. The key-
blocks contain no transactions and each time they are created,
the miner is chosen as the leader to produce microblocks,
so in this sense the microblocks are linked directly to the
keyblock. Microblocks contain transactions and are produced
without Proof-of-Work, so transactions are batched and can
be produced quicker. Figure 8 presents an overview of this
structure.
Keyblocki. . . Microblock Microblock Keyblocki+1 . . .
Figure 8. Bitcoin-NG Block Overview
2) ComChain
ComChain [209], the “Community Blockchain”, proposes the
configuration block, a new block type that defines a subset of
nodes chosen to form the next consensus committee. When a
new consensus committee is being proposed, a configuration
block is sent to the current committee to be agreed upon.
Once agreed, the new committee is formed and begins par-
ticipating in consensus on the blocks containing transactions.
The proposed configuration must be validated and all pending
transactions and blocks should be transferred to the new
committee to commit through the consensus. The structure
is depicted in Figure 9.
Config 1. . .
txblocki txblockj txblockk
Config 2
txblockl txblockm
. . .
Figure 9. Community Blockchain (ComChain) structure.
B. New Structures
Rather than proposing changes to block types, some propos-
als focus primarily on the blockchain structure. The blockchain
originated as a single, canonical chain appending blocks
sequentially. However, new proposals provide a number of
changes that allow for blocks, or transactions, to be committed
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in a variety of ways. This presents opportunities for parallel
block processing or new communication patterns between
nodes.
1) Fruitchains
The Fruitchains [161] blockchain introduces an alternate struc-
ture to the blockchain and decouples transaction processing
from block processing. Rather than transaction records being
appended directly onto the chain inside a block, they are
packed into a fruit, which is a batch of transactions. To append
a fruit to a chain, it hangs from one block, referencing a recent
block. The referenced block must not be too far from the block
the fruit is attached to, as shown in Figure 10. By decoupling
the transaction batching inside a block and having the fruits,
transactions can be processed and committed to the chain with
reference to the state they were processed in. This provides
the ability to process more transactions while still ensuring the
validity of the state.
In the Bitcoin blockchain, miners creating orphaned blocks
will not get any reward, which is not fair to them as they
also contributed their computing power. Fruitchains provides
a fairer reward distribution, as the creator of fruits hanged
from a recent block can also get its mining reward.
Bi. . . Bj Bk Bl Bm . . .
Fi Fk
Fl
Fm
Figure 10. Fruitchains Structure
2) ByzCoin
ByzCoin [120], inspired by Bitcoin-NG [84], provides a new
structure for the blockchain to improve transaction through-
put by decoupling the transactions from the block creation.
Unlike Bitcoin-NG, ByzCoin separated the microblocks and
keyblocks into separate chains as shown in Figure 11, where
two parallel chains store the information. The creation of
Keyblocks is utilized to form a consensus committee. The
consensus committee participates in BFT consensus to produce
microblocks, which are appended to a second parallel chain
every few seconds.
RepuCoin: Similar to ByzCoin, RepuCoin [221] presents a
similar idea of decoupling transactions. RepuCoin utilizes the
keyblocks for leader election and the consensus committee.
When a keyblock is proposed, and the consensus committee
agrees on this new block, it becomes pinned. From the moment
the keyblock is pinned and committed, the microblocks are
produced from the leader and consensus group. Like ByzCoin,
RepuCoin follows a structure of parallel chains, where key-
blocks are mined and committed, referencing each predecessor
keyblock, whereas the microblocks run on a parallel chain
referencing predecessor microblocks but also reference the
most recent keyblock.
Keyblocki. . . Keyblockj . . .
Microblock Microblock. . . Microblock Microblock Microblock . . .
Figure 11. ByzCoin Microblock and Keyblock structure
3) HashGraph (Swirlds)
Swirlds [25] modified the traditional blockchain structure by
proposing a graph structure where each “block” has multi-
ple children or parents. Swirlds presents the HashGraph, a
directed acyclic graph in which the “blockchain” utilizes all
blocks that are mined. This removes the concept of stale
blocks and encourages forked chains. As seen in Figure 12,
the hashgraph contains vertices and edges, dubbed events and
relationships respectively. An event is gossiped by a node
can contain transaction information and must require hashes
referencing two past events, which is then signed by the
gossiping node. Through gossiping, the receiving node learns
about the context of the event and all other information by
previous nodes in the communication. The nodes can then
agree on the ancestors of the event through offline virtual
voting, as all needed votes from other nodes are contained in
the received gossips. Although nodes may learn of events in
differing places of their graph, an event is said to be consistent
if it has equivalent ancestors in all node’s graphs.
Alice Bob Carol Dave
A B C D
Figure 12. HashGraph Structure. An example round of communication and
event gossiping.
4) Beacon Chain
Dfinity [100] envisioned a chain where a set of nodes selected
through a random beacon would propose and notarize blocks.
Ethereum Serenity [82, 208], proposed a similar concept but
adopted a sharded blockchain model. The single, canonical
beacon chain would serve as the backbone for the shards oper-
ating in parallel. The shard blockchains handle state transitions
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and hold transaction information, whereas the beacon chain
acts as a point of cross-shard communication and knowledge
of shard states. Figure 13 illustrates the concept of the beacon
chain with two shards.
Shard A
. . .
Shard B
. . .
Beacon Chain
. . .
Figure 13. Beacon Chain as adopted by Ethereum Serenity
5) Tangle (IOTA)
IOTA [168] presents the tangle, a DAG which removes blocks
from the storage structure. The tangle DAG, as illustrated in
Figure 14, stores transactions as vertices and requires each
vertex to have an edge between two (or more) previous
transactions. This forms the directed structure and the edges
constitute to the validity of the transactions. The transactions
are gossiped through the network and are placed into the DAG
of the node when received. Unconfirmed transactions, named
tips are placed into the graph as leaves and are assigned a
weight. The weight of the tip is proportional to the transactions
it references, with respect to the recency and weight of
referenced transactions.
For a tip to become validated, it must gain a high confir-
mation confidence by getting referenced by new transactions
over time as the DAG continues to grow. Although the DAG
may differ between nodes, the transaction ancestors will be
common amongst nodes and will therefore be passed through
the consensus to be agreed upon. Analysis [227] shows that
such structure largely improves the scalability of blockchain.
tx0
tx1
tx2
tx3
tx4
tx5
tx6
tx7
tx8
tx9
Figure 14. IOTA’s tangle structure.
6) Block Lattice (RaiBlocks)
RaiBlocks [128] introduced the block lattice, depicted in
Figure 15. The distinguishing feature of the block lattice is that
each account maintains its own personal blockchain, the DAG
ledger consists of the global set of accounts and their relevant
blockchain. Each transaction sent from user to user requires
two transactions, a “send” transaction signed by the transaction
origin owner, and a “receive” transaction, signed by the party
receiving the transaction. Similarly, each party must create a
block on their respective chain, a “send block” and “receive
block”. Figure 15 depicts an example communication between
parties. The pattern formed by the transactions forms a lattice
of send and receive blocks, forming the DAG structure. Any
conflicting transactions that are detected require a vote to be
passed, in which the majority vote wins.
Alice Bob Carol Dave
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Figure 15. Block Lattice example execution and structure overview.
VII. ATTACKS
Blockchains are susceptible to a number of attacks [58].
Each varying implementation requires assumptions which of-
ten leads to limitations and vulnerabilities. The known attacks
utilize these assumptions to empower the adversary to double
spend, or, deny the service of the blockchain to others.
Table IV, Table V and Table VI present an overview of the
attacks reviewed in this section.
A. Mining Power Attacks
The mining power attacks target systems that utilize Proof-
of-Work membership selection combined with any consensus
that suffers from forks. The mining power attacks are focused
on an adversary gaining sufficient amount of mining power to
double spend, or, take control of the chain. To allow for more
profitable mining, nodes often collude together to form mining
pools, allowing cost sharing of profits and higher probability
of block rewards. The Bitcoin network consists of a number of
pools [37]. In July 2014, the GHash.IO mining pool exceeded
the 51% threshold. At the time of viewing, the largest pool
is the BTC.com pool which controls 29.1% of the networks
computational power. The second highest, AntPool, controls
13.3%, closely followed by ViaBTC (10.6%) and SlushPool
(10.1%). It can be seen that if the top three pools collude,
they control the majority of the network and can therefore
control the chain. Similarly, in the Ethereum blockchain14,
mining pools, such as Ethermine (27.5%), f2pool 2 (16.6%),
14Data available online: https://etherscan.io/stat/miner?range=7&
blocktype=blocks. Accessed 25 Apr. 2018
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SparkPool (15.7%) and Nanopool (14.1%), control a large
portion of the network mining power.
51%: The most noted attack is the majority mining attack,
also referred to as the 51% Attack. The attack allows an
adversary to control the blockchain, validating invalid trans-
actions and censoring the entire network as they wish. If an
adversary is able to gain the majority of the mining power,
they have the ability to produce valid blocks faster than other
nodes, or pools, with high probability, meaning they are able to
create alternative chains with a false history, allowing arbitrary
double-spending.
This attack targets the adversary assumption that the honest
nodes hold the majority of the network’s resources. Due to
the distribution of computing power in current Proof-of-Work
blockchains, gaining a majority of the network’s resources can
be seen as a practically infeasible task, as the cost would be
too significant unless the attack was carried out in early stages.
However, proposed techniques [21, 38, 101, 152] make it
plausible for an adversary to gain a 51% of the resources
and exploit this assumption. It is also worth noting that large
mining pools develop over time and collusion amongst the
large pools may provide enough power to control the network.
1) Bribery Attack (Flash Attacks)
The Bribery Attack [38], also known as the flash attack,
consists of an adversary temporarily gaining the majority of
the mining power for malicious use. This attack allows for
the adversary to gain temporary control of the chain, allowing
a window where they are able to double spend or censor
transactions. The adversary gains a majority of the mining
power by renting computing power. This can be achieved
through out-of-band bribes, in-band bribes or through renting
computing power. The methodology follows an attacker issu-
ing a transaction in the chain to a merchant. Once the merchant
is satisfied with the block confirmations, the adversary utilizes
the gained computing power to create a conflicting transaction
in a forked chain. The adversary controls the majority of the
network mining power, and is then able to extend the forked
chain quicker than the network and win the longest chain
in fork resolution, where the merchant will no longer gain
the funds due to the conflicting transaction. The adversary
is not concerned about the long-term health of the chain, so
consequences of the bribery attack may be felt by the network.
This attack can be facilitated by the use of cloud services
providing easily available computing power, or through collu-
sion of mining pools. However, a large investment or bribe is
needed to gain the majority of the network power, even for a
short period of time.
B. Strategic Mining
Strategic mining attacks exploit the decentralized nature of
the blockchain, as each node contributing to the system is
required to uphold their own local copy of the chain. Strategic
mining attacks consist of withholding information from other
nodes for later use to cheat the system.
1) Selfish Mining attack
This selfish mining attack was proposed where pools mine
blocks in secret [85]. The attack requires an adversary to con-
trol a significant amount (>25%) of mining power, such that it
can keep up with the chain progress. The attack methodology
requires the pool to mine blocks in secret, selfishly keeping
the produced blocks from the other nodes in the network.
Selectively, the pool can choose to release the newly produced
blocks to waste the honest miners computational power on
producing old blocks.
An extension to this work [189] highlighted optimal strate-
gies for selfish mining and showed that the selfish mining had
optimal and sub-optimal conditions for success. Such optimal
suggestions include conditions where the adversary should
adopt network blocks, override network blocks of their own,
match the block or wait. These actions, if selected effectively,
could lead to a more optimal selfish mining strategy.
This attack is highly dependent on the pool’s mining power.
The pool must be able to produce a blockchain branch that is
longer than the public branch. When they choose to release
their branch, they will win the longest chain rule, allowing
them to falsely operate the chain.
2) Finney Attack
The Finney Attack [86] was proposed in the Bitcoin forums
as a way to double-spend against a merchant. The pre-
requisite for this attack’s success is that a merchant delivers an
irrevocable product or service at the time of payment, meaning
waiting for 0 block confirmations. The adversary engages with
the merchant and sends coins for the service or goods that are
irreversible. At this point, the merchant completes the trade.
Simultaneously, the adversary then creates a transaction to
themselves and mines a block, which includes this transaction.
The adversary then quickly broadcasts the block with the
transaction to themselves. If quick enough, the transaction to
the merchant will conflict, and the transaction back to self will
be confirmed in a block and accepted by the network.
This attack leverages the merchant’s assumption that trans-
action confirmations do not require block confirmations. To
remedy this attack, merchants are advised to wait the recom-
mended block confirmation, implementation specific, which
will give a higher probability of the transaction being con-
firmed into the chain.
3) Fast-Payment Double Spending
Similar to Finney’s attack, the Double Spending attacks on
Fast-Payments [117] leverages a merchant’s acceptance of a
transaction with 0 block confirmations. Fast Payments are
payments where a transaction is considered accepted within a
minute of it being proposed in the network. Conversely, Slow
Payments require a threshold block confirmation.
The adversary begins the attack by connecting to the mer-
chant as a peer. The adversary sends the transaction to the
merchant for an irrevocable action. After some small delta
time, the adversary sends a conflicting transaction to the other
peers it is connected to. There is a high probability that the
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Table IV
ATTACKS OVERVIEW: PART 1
Category Attack Overview Attack Core Cause
Mining
51% An adversary that controls the strict majority of the mining power
has the ability to double spend coins and control the chain. • An adversary is able to obtain strictly greater than 50% of the
total network mining power.
f ′ > N
′
2
Bribery/Flash An adversary bribes others to gain a strict majority of the mining
power to perform a 51% attack in a short time period. • Mining power can be paid/bribed or rented.
• The overall cost of the attack is (a) less than purchasing resources
to perform a 51% attack, and (b) less than the overall reward
gained from performing the attack.
f ′ > N
′
2
Strategic
Mining
Selfish Mining A mining pool mines a fork in secret. They then release the fork to
the network using a smart strategy to waste the work of others and
ensure their private fork is considered the longest chain.
• Pool has significant amount of mining power, and, can mine
quicker than network.
• No transaction or blocks leaked to network.
Probabilistic Consensus
Finney’s The adversary sends a transaction to a merchant for some irrevocable
action, however, the adversary mines a separate conflicting transac-
tion into a block. The merchant performs the action as soon as the
transaction is sent into the network. At this point, the adversary
releases the block containing the conflicting transaction and the
original transaction to the merchant is invalidated.
• Merchant trades with 0 block confirmations.
• Adversary’s original transaction does not get mined into a block
before releasing the conflicting block.
• Synchrony
• Favor Availability
• Probabilistic Consensus
Double Spending
Fast Payments
An adversary connects as a peer to a merchant and issues a trans-
action directly for an irrevocable action. The merchant accepts the
transaction without any block confirmations and performs the action.
Simultaneously, the adversary sends a conflicting transaction to the
other peers. With non-zero probability, the conflicting transaction
propagates faster and is mined into a block.
• A merchant accepts a transaction with 0 blocks.
• The adversary’s conflicting transaction propagates the network
quicker.
• The adversary’s transaction is mined into a block before the
merchants.
• Synchrony
• Probabilistic Consensus
Rosenfeld’s An adversary solo mines a private longest branch in secret, with-
holding all information from other nodes. They then interact with a
merchant, who requires some number of block confirmations before
executing an irreversible action. Once the merchant is satisfied and
performs the action, the adversary releases the solo mined branch
which wins the longest chain and is accepted as the main chain,
invalidating the transaction to the merchant.
• An adversary can mine a branch in secret without any information
leakage.
• The adversary can mine the longest branch.
• A merchant trades with a low block confirmation.
• Synchrony
• Probabilistic Consensus
Vector76 An adversary interacts with a merchant who performs an action
as soon as the transaction is accepted into a block. The adversary
quickly sends a self-mined block containing the transaction directly
to the merchant and the action is performed, while simultane-
ously submitting a conflicting transaction to the network. Once the
merchant learns of the network’s chain, the adversary’s block is
invalidated and lost.
• A merchant trades with 1 block confirmation.
• The adversary can mine a block quicker than the network.
• The Merchant never learns of the network’s block and the
adversary can propagate the block directly to the merchant quicker
than merchant learning of network block.
• Synchrony
• Probabilistic Consensus
Withholding
Mining Pools
An adversary joins a mining pool, but hides all valid Proof-of-Work
they mine. This lowers the potential revenue for the pool as they
miss out on a number of blocks.
• Static pool membership; all members stay in the pool regardless
of revenue profits.
• Membership rules are not strict and do not require nodes to submit
certain amounts of work.
This attack is not on membership selec-
tion nor on consensus. Rather, it is an
attack on the mining pool software and
infrastructure, which is independent to
the blockchain system.
Strategic
Mining
+
Communication
Stubborn Mining An adversary mines blocks with the honest network, only selfishly
mining when an optimal strategy proves successful. By releasing
blocks periodically (rather than the entire chain at once), the ad-
versary is able to mine a private chain and gain profit for longest
chain.
• Adversary can mine blocks in a private chain and keep up with
the network.
• No information leakage of the adversary’s chain unless specifi-
cally by the adversary.
• Synchrony
• Probabilistic Consensus
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conflicting transaction propagates through the network faster
than the original transaction to the merchant and is mined into
a block. Once the transaction has been mined into a block, the
double spend has occurred.
This leverages the merchant accepting “fast payments”
where a transaction is accepted with no block confirmations
in a small period of time. Secondly, it requires the conflicting
transaction to propagate the network and be mined into a block
quicker than the original merchant transaction.
4) Rosenfeld’s Attack
Rosenfeld’s proposed attack [187] is a variant of the strategic
mining attack, where nodes withhold block production from
other nodes. The adversary solo mines a long branch in secret,
keeping all information from other nodes. The adversary
then interacts with a merchant, issuing a transaction for an
irreversible action. Once the merchant has successfully com-
pleted the action, and is satisfied with block confirmations, the
adversary releases the longer, solo-mined branch and conflicts
with the main, public branch. Since the adversary holds the
longest branch, the adversarial chain is accepted and the
merchant’s transaction is no longer in the chain.
This attack is highly dependent on the adversary controlling
a major portion of the computational power. If the adversary
is unable to solo-mine a longer branch, the attack will not be
successful as the smaller branch will not be accepted by other
nodes in the network. Furthermore, if the merchant waits for a
large amount of confirmations, the adversary will be required
to mine a longer branch for longer, making the cost of the
attack rise.
5) Vector76 Attack
The Vector76 attack [206] was proposed on the BitcoinTalk
forums by the user “vector76”, where an adversary wishes
to double-spend against a merchant. The requirement for
this attack’s success is the merchant’s assumption that a
transaction is confirmed within 1 block, meaning as soon as
the transaction is accepted into a block it is confirmed. The
adversary interacts with the merchant, and creates a transaction
to pay for irreversible goods or services. The adversary mines
a block in secret, containing the transaction to the merchant.
When the adversary learns about a new block, they quickly
send the block they mined to the merchant directly. At this
point, the merchant can see the transaction in the block and
performs the action, or trades the goods. When the merchant
learns of the forked chain, they will select the other chain as
correct, discarding the adversary’s block, which includes the
adversary’s transaction. The adversary double spends the coins
by including a conflicting transaction in the alternate chain.
This attack is dependent upon the merchant accepting the
transaction as soon as it has been included in a block.
Furthermore, the adversary must be able to provide a valid
block faster than the network, and propagate it to the merchant
quicker than the merchant learning of the alternate chain.
If the merchant receives the network’s block faster than the
adversary’s block, they may decide to reject the adversary.
6) Withholding Attack against Mining Pools
The Block Withholding Attack [24, 186] is an attack targeted
towards mining pools. An adversarial miner joins a mining
pool and begins the mining protocol. Mining in a pool gener-
ates both partial Proof-of-Work and Full Proof-of-Work. The
adversary can determine whether the proof-of-work they have
mined is valid or invalid. When the adversary mines a valid
hash, they withhold it from the pool, wasting the time of the
pool and having the potential for the pool to miss out on a
number of blocks. The motivation for this attack is to attack
mining pools and lower their overall block reward.
This attack heavily relies on the share model of the mining
pool, but can be mitigated by having strict conditions on the
membership of the nodes in the pool as well as adjusting the
pool based on the profits made.
7) Stubborn Mining
Selfish mining attacks alone may prove to be too impractical
for real-world applications. The requirements for performing
selfish mining lower the profit margin. However, through
applying optimal mining strategies, and potentially combining
with network-level attacks, the revenue may prove to be
profitable.
The Stubborn Mining attack [153], proposed by Nayak et
al., builds upon selfish mining by introducing mining strategies
to increase success and revenue, rather than selfishly mining
and releasing the private chain in one instance. The Lead
Mining strategy is where the adversary leads by k blocks and
releases blocks the same height as the network-mined blocks.
Alternatively, the Equal Fork strategy means the adversary
would conceal any new blocks even if they have no lead,
and mine until they lead. The Trail strategy depicts a miner
that continues to mine even if they fall behind, until a certain
threshold j number of blocks behind. If the miner is j blocks
behind, they accept the honest network chain and continue to
mine, however, if they succeed and catch up to the network’s
chain they then introduce the fork resolution where they own
the blocks that are in the chain and can profit. By applying
these strategies, a stubborn miner is able to increase revenue
and make their chain the chosen chain.
These strategies applied by a stubborn miner can be com-
bined with network attacks to further improve the revenue
potential and percentage of success of the attack. Examples
such as the Eclipse Attack [101] can be used to isolate nodes
and the adversary can then censor or collude with the eclipsed
miner to gain profit.
This attack requires an adversary to mine blocks to try and
keep up with the network. Furthermore, the strategies require
no blocks to be leaked from the adversarial chain.
C. Communication Attacks
Alternatively to mining attacks, the adversaries can utilize
the peer-to-peer network of the blockchain to attack the
system. The segregation and isolation of nodes can often be
leveraged to perform double-spending attacks.
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1) BGP Routing Attack
BGP is the routing protocol responsible for connecting Au-
tonomous Systems (AS) together and routing IP packets
through the internet. Autonomous Systems are responsible for
publishing IP prefixes, and Routers utilize this to route packets.
Since the blockchain requires nodes to connect to peers over
the internet, BGP is inherently used to route the packets to
the other nodes. However, in BGP the validity of any route
advertisements are unchecked, as any AS can advertise a given
IP prefix and if they advertise a more specific prefix (e.g. \21
is more specific than \20) they will become the preferred route
for the routing from other ASes. However, monitors [218]
and methods exist to detect [191] and provide resilience [226]
against BGP prefix hijacking.
The BGP Routing Attack [21] proposed against the Bitcoin
blockchain exploits the lack of verification in BGP to isolate a
group of nodes. Once the group of nodes has been successfully
isolated, the adversary can then delay block propagation or
leave the nodes uninformed, utilizing their mining power for
their own benefit.
This attack relies on the ability of the adversary to isolate
nodes in the network through BGP route hijacking, and
upholding the advertised route for a long period of time.
2) Eclipse Attack
Hijacking BGP routes can be seen as a difficult task, as
the adversary is required to advertise a specific prefix and
maintain the preferred route for all isolated nodes. However,
other methods exist to isolate specified node(s) on the network
for an adversary to perform an attack.
The blockchain is a decentralized, peer-to-peer network
where all nodes connect to others and form a gossip-based
network. All nodes learn about information broadcast from
other nodes. Different implementations allow nodes to connect
to various numbers of other nodes, in Bitcoin it allows for
125 peers to be connected, 117 incoming and 8 outgoing
connections, whereas Ethereum defaults to 25 peers.
The Eclipse attack [101] describes an attack in which a node
can be eclipsed and isolated from the network by leveraging
the peer-to-peer connections of the blockchain. The adversary
populates the peer tables of the victim node, spoofing as many
possible IPs into the victim node as possible. When the victim
node restarts, they will try to reconnect to the nodes in the peer
IP table. If the adversary has successfully populated a large
percentage of the IPs in the peer table, the node will connect
all peers to the adversary. The adversary can now control the
information seen by the victim, and is now able to execute
double-spending attacks or delay attacks.
This attack relies on the adversary being able to insert
a large number of IPs into the victim’s peer table. It also
leveraged the eviction mechanism used by the node to replace
old IPs. Countermeasures have been suggested, and imple-
mented [101, 148], to become resilient to the attack.
3) The Balance Attack
Alternative to isolating a single node, the assumptions of
the blockchain consensus can be used to assist an adver-
sary to execute double-spending. Inspired by the Blockchain
Anomaly [151], the Balance Attack [152] proposes an attack
where the adversary partitions the network into groups of
nodes with balanced computational power. Each subgraph of
nodes will create a fork of the chain, which at some point,
will require a resolution. The adversary issues a transaction
into the fork containing the merchant. The merchant waits
for the specified block confirmations, and performs the action
providing irrevocable goods or services to the adversary.
At this point, the adversary then issues a conflicting trans-
action in another subgraph, and provides additional computa-
tional power, assisting to create a longer, or heavier, chain.
The adversary slowly re-introduces the subgraphs together,
growing the number of nodes that accept the adversary fork
containing the conflicting transaction. When the merchant’s
subgraph learns of the fork, they will accept the adversary
fork and the transaction to the merchant will be invalidated
on the fork, executing the double-spending.
This attack heavily relies on the ability of the attacker to
partition the network into balanced subgroups where their
computational power will provide a significant benefit to the
subgraph, and keep the network segregated until the fork can
be resolved.
4) Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
The Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks proposed against
Ethereum [74] illustrates the applicability of BGP route hi-
jacking to double spend on a public blockchain. By hijacking
a BGP route, the adversary can manipulate the communication
delay between nodes and subgroups of nodes. Once the
adversary is in control of the communication delay, they can
leverage their position to perform other attacks, illustrated with
the Balance Attack [152] in the proposal.
Similarly, Ekparinya et al. also show the effectiveness of
a MitM attack in a private blockchain context by using ARP
spoofing [74] to double spend.
5) Attack of the Clones
The Attack of the Clones [75] presents an attack on the
Proof-of-Authority blockchains in Ethereum [116, 156, 216].
This attack requires an adversarial authority, or a number of
adversarial authorities, to duplicate their node instances and
require them to have a exhibit the same public-private key pair.
The adversary then partitions the network, with one cloned
instance in each partition. The network continues to create
blocks in separate partitions, and therefore double spending
and conflicting transactions can be proposed and accepted into
the partitions.
The proposed mitigations to the attack include the use of a
partially synchronous consensus algorithm, such that message
delays have lower impact on the operation of the system.
Similarly, requiring a threshold of the sealers to sign the blocks
helps to harden the protocol, as it requires the adversary to
have a larger pool of sealers to allow the block to be produced
in the forks.
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Table V
ATTACKS OVERVIEW: PART 2
Category Attack Overview Attack Core Cause
Communication BGP Routing An adversary hijacks BGP routes and isolates groups of nodes. Once successful,
and no information is being leaked, the adversary can control the information
the nodes observe. This allows for potential double spending or utilizing the
group’s mining power for personal profit.
• Adversary can advertise (and hold) BGP routes without au-
tonomous systems being suspicious.
• No multi-homing for nodes.
• No information leakage across the isolated group(s).
Synchrony
Eclipse Attack An adversary eclipses a node to isolate them from the network. The adversary
achieves this by populating the victim’s peer tables, due to eviction mechanisms
the adversary can control enough peers to completely isolate the node. Once
successful, the adversary now controls information observed by the victim and
is able to double spend.
• Adversary can spoof a high number of peers, and keep the
connections alive.
• The peer eviction mechanism doesn’t use “try before replace”.
• There is a low number of buckets in the peer table.
Synchrony
Balance Attack The adversary partitions the network into balanced powered subgraphs of nodes.
Once the subgraphs have forked, the adversary transacts to a merchant in one
subgraph, and joins another subgraph to increase it’s block production. Once the
adversary’s subgraph has a longer fork, they begin to resolve the partition across
subgraphs, resolving the fork and double spending the coins to the merchant.
• The adversary can partition and control the network.
• The adversary can transact in two subgraphs without any infor-
mation leakage or nodes knowing of the segregation.
• Adversary can contribute enough block creation power that their
chosen subgraph forms the longer chain.
• Synchrony
• Probabilistic Consensus
MitM Attacks The adversary hijacks routes (BGP) or spoofs (ARP) to Man-in-the-Middle the
communication against nodes. Once the adversary is positioned correctly, they
are able to manipulate the communication delay between nodes and perform
other communication attacks.
• Adversary can advertise (and hold) BGP routes without au-
tonomous systems being suspicious.
• No multi-homing for nodes/mining pools.
• The adversary is the preferred route for communication and is
situated in the middle.
• The adversary is able to manipulate communication delay be-
tween nodes.
Synchrony
Attack of the
Clones
The adversary partitions the Proof-of-Authority network and duplicates their
node to be present in each partition with duplicated public-private key pairs.
Proof-of-Authority will then adjust to ensure progress, and the adversary will
be able to produce blocks on each partition and therefore make conflicting
transactions or double spend.
• Adversary can duplicate their instance without being detected as
a duplicate.
• Adversary is able to partition the authority groups and place one
clone in each partition.
• The block proposal/validation will still progress even with a
significant number of authorities partitioned.
Synchrony
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D. Stake Attacks
With the increasing popularity of Proof-of-Stake based
approaches, identified attacks allow an adversary to gain power
and profit in the chain by investigating minimal stake, or
to make other selected nodes (a.k.a. validators or consensus
group members) loss their stake. Proof-of-Stake, however,
suffers from considerable validator collusion. If the majority
of the validators collude to perform actions, then the Proof-
of-Stake mechanism can fail in some cases.
1) Nothing at Stake
One of the first attacks on Proof-of-Stake is called “Nothing at
Stake” [83], where rational validators aim at getting rewards
by not following the protocol’s specification. Proof-of-Stake
based validation incentive means validators are encouraged to
follow protocol to earn rewards. In the case of a fork, the most
optimal strategy for validators is that they should validate on
all possible chains for the chance of most reward.
Adversaries are able to leverage this behavior, and with non
zero probability execute a double spending attack. The adver-
sary creates a transaction to a merchant, and simultaneously
creates a fork in the chain with a conflicting transaction. At this
point, the validators will begin validating all chains due to the
economic incentive. With non-zero probability, the adversary’s
forked chain may be selected as the correct chain to extend
and the double spending has occurred with the attacker staking
nothing during the process.
A solution to the Nothing at Stake problem is for the
validators to commit value to sign and create valid blocks. This
acts as a disincentive for the validators creating and signing
blocks on all forks, or they will lose some money and be
ultimately punished.
Alternatively, unforkable blockchains also present a solution
to the nothing at stake problem as the adversary will be unable
to create a fork with the conflicting transaction.
2) Discouragement
Alternatively, the adversary can discourage validator partic-
ipation in the validation of blocks. In some proof-of-stake
schemes, the validator group is punished if certain condi-
tions are met and disagreement occurs. The Discouragement
Attack [207] outlines an attack where the adversary can
purposely act maliciously and broadcast their intention to other
validators. Due to validators possibility to lose money, val-
idators withdraw themselves from the committee. Eventually,
the number of nodes in the validator set will diminish, due to
discouragement, and the adversary can now perform a majority
attack.
3) Censorship
Instead of validators working independently, adversarial col-
lusion can lead to validators dictating the operation of the
blockchain. The Censorship attack [44] can occur when valida-
tors collude to censor certain transactions from being placed
into blocks. The attack ramifications lead to the destruction
of the blockchain ecosystems and breaking the core values
of the blockchain. This attack relies on the collusion of the
validators, as the majority of the validators would have to agree
on the censoring of specific blocks or transactions. However,
adversaries may leverage other methods to lower the number
of validators in the set until satisfied with the conditions.
Possible solutions to censorship arise with introduction of
cost or mechanisms to the consensus. An example of changing
the reward structure to be proportional to the number of
validators that signed the block, for example if 98 of 100
validators sign the block, then the validators that signed would
only be getting 98% of the reward. Unless full collusion
amongst all validators occurs, then the validators censoring
would not receive the full bonus and may not be economically
incentivized to uphold the censoring. Rotation of validators for
each block can also overcome censorship, as the validators
performing the censoring would only be able to in the time
window.
4) Grinding
Implementations of Proof-of-Stake have mechanisms to select
a validator from the active set of validators to create and
propose the next block. In some cases, the selection of a
validator follows the rule that a node has a probability of
being selected proportional to the amount of stake they have
contributed as a percentage of the total. The Grinding [79]
attacks are attacks where a validator takes steps to increase the
bias of their selection as a validator, through some computation
or other methods.
With PeerCoin, or PPCoin [119], the stake is based upon
the coin-age, and the validators probability of success is
determined based on the age they consume in the block
creation process. The Grinding attack can be applied in this
scenario where the adversary performs computation and grind
through combinations of parameters in blocks to provide the
best probability of their coins creating a valid block.
Similarly, NXT [155] implements Proof-of-Stake where the
randomness for the next block is dependent on the signature
of it’s predecessor in the chain. Due to the nature of the signa-
tures, the validator can execute a grinding attack and compute
the randomness, selectively manipulating randomness [41] by
skipping their turn to create a block. The validator can then
calculate the optimal strategy such that they gain an above-
average number of blocks to sign, leading to higher reward
for the validator.
Known solutions [41, 79, 119] exist to the stake grinding
attack. In PPCoin, validators can be asked to stake their coins
well in advance of the block creation, such that the validator
cannot grind the best probability for their coins to win. The
randomness can also be improved through the use of secret
sharing and threshold signatures, as well as validators all
collaboratively generating the randomness.
5) Stake Bleeding
Proof-of-Stake provides a number of improvements to the
current blockchain, however, it has been outlined that it suffers
from a number of theoretical attacks and vulnerabilities. To
oppose the vulnerabilities, proposed security measures have
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Table VI
ATTACKS OVERVIEW: PART 3
Category Attack Overview Attack Core Cause
Stake
Nothing at Stake Members have incentives to validate blocks on all possible chains to gain the
most profit. This means an adversary can fork the chain and have a high
probability of successfully getting their chain accepted.
• Members do not lose stake on validating an incorrect chain.
• Adversary does not lose money by forking the chain.
• The blockchain suffers from forks.
Incentive Punishment
Discouragement In Proof-of-Stake, members lose stake if agreement cannot be reached. An
adversary threatens and discourages members from staying in the consensus
committee by acting maliciously and purposely avoiding reaching agreement.
As members leave the consensus committee, the adversary will gain a higher
percentage of stake and can eventually perform a majority stake attack.
• An adversary can sacrifice enough stake for members to leave.
• Honest validators do not join the validation and overthrow the
adversary.
• Incentive Punishment
• f > N
2
Censorship Adversarial collusion between members can lead to censorship of blocks and
transactions from being accepted to the chain. • Majority validator collusion.
• No cost model that hinders rewards.
• No adequate validator rotation.
f > N
2
Grinding An adversary grinds through parameters, or known computations, to find a
strategy that will increase the number of blocks they validate, or, the amount
of reward they get. The main aspect is to maximize the node’s probability of
selection by finding optimal parameters.
• Validators don’t require to stake coins in advance.
• Bad, or computable randomness.
Incentive Punishment
Stake Bleeding An adversary creates a hidden, forked chain. In the main chain, each time they
are asked to validate they refuse and slow the block production. Eventually, the
adversarial chain will grow and can win the longest chain if the main chain is
delayed enough.
• No checkpoint mechanism implemented. • Synchrony
• Probabilistic Consensus
Long Range An adversary interacts with a merchant and sends a transaction for an irrevocable
action. Once the action has been performed, the Adversary starts a fork from
a significant distance in the past (e.g. directly after the genesis block) and
eventually produces a longer chain. The adversary can then produce the longest
chain and win the fork resolution.
• Timestamps are not used for authentication.
• Context sensitive transactions are not used.
• No checkpoint mechanism implemented.
• Synchrony
• Probabilistic Consensus
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been implemented which provide mechanisms countering the
possible attacks. The introduction of checkpointing, a measure
to solidify the blockchain state and eliminate all forks that are
not complying with the latest checkpoint, allowed for a number
of attacks to be mitigated.
For Proof-of-Stake blockchains that fail to implement
checkpointing, as well as employ transaction-fee reward-based
incentives, can be vulnerable to the Stake Bleeding attack [92],
where an adversary can convince the network to adopt a sec-
ondary chain. The attack methodology requires an adversary
that holds a moderate proportion of the stake in a blockchain
that adheres to the longest chain protocol of Nakamoto’s
Consensus. The adversary creates a secondary chain, hidden
from honest parties. Each time the adversary is chosen to
extend the valid chain, they refuse and slow down the process,
whereas they continue extending their private chain.
Over time, the adversary will lose stake in the honest chain,
but will gain rewards in the fake chain and slowly with the
inclusion of valid transactions will exceed the valid chain. At
this point the adversary can release their private chain and
all honest nodes will accept it as the valid chain due to it’s
superior length.
Proposed mitigations [30, 62, 92, 118, 127] to this attack
consist of frequent checkpointing, chain and block density, and
context-sensitive transactions which may include the hash of
the most recent blocks in the transaction. Similarly, PPCoin’s
coin-age [119] also helps to prevent stake bleeding by requir-
ing the investment of time.
E. Long Range
The Long Range Attack [42] was theorized during the
early development of Ethereum by Vitalik Buterin. The attack
details a sequence of events where an adversary is able
to double spend. The adversary sends a transaction to the
merchant, the merchant then accepts the transaction after a
certain number of block confirmations. The adversary then
creates a fork, but starts it from a much earlier block, for
example just after the genesis block.
In Proof-of-Work, the adversary would be required to hold
a majority of the network’s computing power, constituting this
attack as a majority mining attack. However, the methodology,
where the attacker can utilize a smart contract to perform
hashes that are very easy to mine, producing a known value
for itself, but would be extremely costly to the other miners.
For example, it can be a loop for a specific value that the
adversary knows, but others will have to re-compute the value
each time. In this way, the attacker is able to slow the progress
of the honest chain. The adversary then continues to mine until
they create the longest chain and can overtake the main chain.
This attack requires a high amount of computing power, such
that the adversary is able to create the longest chain. In Proof-
of-Stake, however, the attack requirements are lower due to
the validation process. An adversary with as low as 1% of
all coins can perform the long range attack with more blocks
trivially.
Proposed mitigations [42, 79, 119] exist for the long range
attack. One example mitigation is to ensure that timestamps
on the blocks are used as a rejection mechanism. Another
alternative is to ensure that a large portion of the coins, for
example 30%, are required to sign every N th block.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss (a) how membership selection,
consensus mechanism, and structure are combined in existing
systems and their impact on each other; (b) other interesting
areas of blockchains not explored in this survey; and (c)
upcoming and future proposals integral to the improvement of
the blockchain, but not mature enough for critical evaluations
and inclusion in the survey.
A. Membership Selection and Consensus
This section provides an overview on how existing systems
make use of different membership selection and consensus
mechanisms. An overview is presented in Table VII.
Role of Membership in Consensus Mechanisms: Al-
though consensus algorithms are powerful, there are some
limitations that impede the security and scalability to high
node numbers.
For security, consensus algorithms rely on the member-
ship selection to provide a set of trustworthy nodes to run
consensus, such that an attacker cannot become a consensus
group member easily. For example, Bitcoin uses proof-of-
work to select consensus group members, where an attacker
with a temporally high mining power can become a con-
sensus member easily. However, with proof-of-reputation in
RepuCoin, it is much more difficult for such an attacker to
become consensus member, thus it helps enforcing the security
assumptions of consensus algorithms.
For scalability, running optimally, without saturating net-
work bandwidth with messages, requires a smaller committee
of members to run the consensus. Membership selection fills
the gap by providing the consensus with a subset of nodes
to form the small committee of consensus members. The
consensus also provides the membership selection with the
requirements and assumptions that it must fulfill.
Nakamoto’s Consensus, for example, requires optimally one
proposer of blocks but places an assumption that the blocks
are propagated to the entirety of the network prior to any new
proposals. This assumption is translated into the difficulty of
the Proof-of-Work puzzle and limits the speed of block pro-
posals and the number of nodes in the membership selection.
This is also evident in the GHOST consensus mechanism, as it
requires an amount of time between proposals so the heaviest
sub-tree is observed by the nodes in the network.
Similarly, in AlgoRand as an example, the BA? consensus
runs optimally with a smaller subset of nodes, rather than all
nodes performing the consensus. The AlgoRand membership
selection utilizes VRFs to provide a subset of nodes as the
committee to run the BA? consensus.
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Table VII
MEMBERSHIP SELECTION AND CONSENSUS
Chain Released Membership Category Consensus Mechanism Type
Bitcoin 2008 Proof-of-Work Work Nakamoto’s Nakamoto
PeerCoin 2012 Proof-of-Coin-Age Stake Nakamoto’s (Highest Age) Nakamoto
Ethereum* 2014/20XX Proof-of-Work/Proof-of-Deposit Work/Stake Nakamoto’s /(Casper) Nakamoto/BFT
Tendermint 2014 Proof-of-Lock Stake Tendermint BFT BFT
PeerCensus 2014 Proof-of-Work Work PeerCensus (PBFT Variant) BFT
Permacoin 2014 Proof-of-Retrievability Capacity Nakamoto’s Consensus Nakamoto
BurstCoin 2014 Proof-of-Space Capacity Nakamoto’s Nakamoto
SpaceMint 2015 Proof-of-Space Capacity Nakamoto’s Nakamoto
ByzCoin 2016 Proof-of-Work Work ByzCoin (PBFT Variant) BFT
HoneyBadger BFT 2016 - - HoneyBadger BFT BFT
Solida 2017 Proof-of-Work Work Solida (PBFT Variant) BFT
Ouroboros 2017 Ouroboros PoS Stake Ouroboros’ Consensus BFT
AlgoRand 2017 AlgoRand Stake AlgoRand BA? BFT
HyperLedger Sawtooth 2017 PoET TEE Nakamoto’s† Nakamoto
RepuCoin 2018 Proof-of-Work Work/Reputation RepuCoin BFT BFT
RedBelly Blockchain 2018 - - DBFT BFT
* The Ethereum blockchain is moving to Proof-of-Stake, currently using Proof-of-Work with the longest chain, but moving to Casper Proof-of-Stake
with a BFT variant (named Casper) for the consensus. This consensus has not been included in the survey as it is still being developed and has a
lack of formal documentation at this time.
† The HyperLedger Sawtooth documentation [104] states that the PoET runs a measure of total time waiting. However, if a PBFT consensus is used,
it will never fork, making the fork resolution and consensus in the system flexible.
Improvements on Bitcoin Membership Selection: To
save the wasted energy in PoW, many membership selection
mechanisms have been proposed. In particular, the proposed
mechanisms either use a stake-based lottery protocol (e.g.
PoCA, PoD) for membership selection, or repurpose the
required work by replacing the to-be-wasted computational
task with something useful (e.g. distributed archive in Proof-
of-Space). Since they are only considering the issue of wasted
energy, they keep using the Nakamoto’s consensus mechanism.
With proposals of the former type, stake-based lottery, new
members are selected at random having a probability propor-
tional to the stake they have. The focus on these proposals
is designing the “stake” they rely on. For example, PeerCoin
makes use of coin age as the stake; and Proof-of-Activity uses
the balance of a participant and its online activity as the stake.
With proposals of the latter, new members are selected also
at random, but the probability is depending on the alternative
useful work they perform. The focus of these proposals
has been on repurposing the wasted energy. For example,
Permacoin, proposes to use distributed archive of files as the
work, and BurstCoin and SpaceMint propose to use distributed
storage space as a means to selected members.
Improvements on Bitcoin Consensus: As mentioned
previously, Nakamoto’s consensus only provides probabilistic
guarantees. This results in potential forks of the chain, and
can be exploited by an attacker to launch double spending
attacks. Prior works try to remedy this issue by replacing the
Nakamoto’s consensus with the classic consensus mechanisms,
i.e., Byzantine fault tolerant protocols that provide determin-
istic guarantee.
To the best of our knowledge, PeerCensus [64] was the first
blockchain to propose Proof-of-Work for membership selec-
tion, and a BFT-style protocol for reaching consensus. In par-
ticular, the miners who successfully solved the recent Proof-
of-Work puzzles form the consensus committee to run the BFT
consensus on the proposed blocks. Similar to PeerCensus, a
number of other chains (e.g. ByzCoin, Solida, and RepuCoin)
utilize Proof-of-Work to select consensus committee members,
and BFT-style consensus for reaching consensus. The focus of
ByzCoin is on scaling the PBFT consensus schemes. Solida
is focusing on providing a solution for consensus committee
reconfiguration. Hybrid consensus [162] aims at providing
an efficient bootstrapping with fast response. RepuCoin uses
reputation-based weighted BFT protocol for reaching consen-
sus. It aims at exploring ways to prevent bribery attack and
flash attacks, where an attacker bribes existing power miners
or rents cloud mining power to obtain a majority of the mining
power quickly for a short time period.
Hybrid systems: Other systems have been working on
combining a number of different techniques. The Proof-of-
Activity [28] combines both Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-
Stake to perform the membership selection. The Proof-of-
Work aspect produces the initial proposer of the empty block,
then used to derive the validators that will sign off the block.
This is a combination of two membership selection techniques
to harmoniously utilize the guarantees of both.
Similarly, Thunderella [164] proposes the use of the BFT
consensus during the optimal periods. In non-optimal condi-
tions, or during the cooldown phases, they switch from using
the BFT to Nakamoto consensus. This provides a hybrid nature
between the BFT based model and the Proof-of-Work longest
chain model.
B. Consensus Mechanism and Structure
This section discusses the impact of the structure on the
consensus mechanisms of choice.
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Role of Structure in Consensus: The structure defines
the way transactions and events are recorded in blockchain
systems. This definition places heavy requirements on the
consensus algorithm and what blocks are proposed and de-
cided upon. The traditional blockchain, as depicted in the
original Bitcoin paper [150], describes one canonical chain
with homogeneous block types. This gives the requirement to
the consensus that a single block should be decided for each
height.
Bitcoin-NG [84] introduces different block types, decou-
pling leader election (keyblocks) from transaction serialization
(microblocks). In particular, miners create keyblocks, which
do not contain any transaction, through PoW. The successful
miner in PoW is selected as a leader for a period of time until
a new keyblock is created. A leader includes transactions into
microblocks, and is allowed to validate microblocks directly
without requiring further proof-of-work. This greatly increases
the scalability of the consensus algorithms, in terms of the
system throughput.
The further evolution of Blockchains introduced the use of
other structures. One such evolution is utilizing a Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) as the structure of the blockchain, where
multiple events are able to occur simultaneously but require
new consensus approaches to provide finality on multiple
events. DAG structures apply different techniques to achieve
consensus on the events that have occurred in the graph.
Additionally, the integration of sharding techniques has
exhibited similar aspects such as parallel transaction process-
ing and the benefit of less storage space required. However,
it also brings new challenges to achieving consensus, such
as transaction and state finality requiring the context of the
shards.
Improving Bitcoin Structure: The original bitcoin struc-
ture, the one canonical chain of homogeneous blocks, provides
the requirement for a distributed ledger of transactions for
a decentralized payment system. However, the evolution of
blockchains involve a number of functionality updates and im-
provements, which propose new structure changes to provide
the new functionality or improvements.
By decoupling the transactions from the block creation,
this allows for a higher throughput of transactions to be
processed and appended to the ledger, whilst still maintaining
the guarantees of the original chain structure. DAG structures
on the other hand require a significantly different consensus
and membership selection model.
C. Membership Selection and Structure
The nature of the structure also imposes requirements on the
membership selection. The structure denotes how blocks are
to be accepted and added, imposing requirements on how the
consensus is to be performed. This impacts the way members
are selected and the type of members that are selected.
Role of Structure in Membership Selection: The structure
may require different types of nodes to be selected in a variety
of ways. The original Bitcoin structure requires one set of
membership to be chosen for each block. The Microblock
structure proposed by ByzCoin and RepuCoin require groups
of nodes to be selected in intervals, differing from the original
where optimally one node would propose and decide on the
next block and be agreed upon by everyone. The introduction
of DAG structures imposes a major change to the membership
selection, where different nodes control different paths on the
total graph, or, are in charge of managing their own ledger of
information.
The introduction of sharding will also impose a number
of changes to the way membership selection is performed.
As each shard will operate in different conditions, different
memberships can be employed for each shard and operate
uniquely.
D. Scalability
Scalability of blockchains can be encompassed by three
main aspects; the number of consensus nodes, the number of
clients, and the number of transactions processed per second
(TPS).
Typically, a client is a node that is not participating in the
consensus and is not actively producing blocks, however is
actively transacting and receiving and gossiping information
around the network. The number of clients have minimal
impact on the overall performance of the blockchain, however,
may impact the overall time for message bandwidth and
propagation in the network. All types of blockchain consensus
scale well [212].
With respect to the number of consensus nodes, non-BFT
blockchain consensus offers impeccable scalability due to
the simplicity of its protocol. BFT protocols, however, have
limited scalability due to message complexity and the types
of communication patterns in the protocols. For example,
Nakamoto’s consensus only requires nodes to choose the
longest chain locally to reach an agreement, so consensus
is able to be reached even in the presence of thousands of
nodes. PBFT, on the other hand, requires several rounds of
communication with all-to-all message passing involving all
consensus members. So in practice, PBFT can only scale to a
few dozen nodes.
For the number of processed transactions per second,
Nakamoto’s consensus, often seen paired with Proof-of-Work,
performs poorly due to the requirement of proposals needing
to propagate through the network. In particular, with Bitcoin,
each block is 1Mb in size, and the size of each transaction
is on average approximately 256 bytes. This limits the block
to contain only approximately 4, 000 transactions, which is
proposed every 10 minutes on average leading to an average of
roughly 7 TPS. Increasing the size of a block is not an effective
solution to improve the performance. For example, Bitcoin
Cash, a hard fork of Bitcoin, increases the maximum block size
from 1 MB to 8MB. Later, in 2018, Bitcoin Cash15 has been
split into two — one is called Bitcoin Adjustable Blocksize
Cap (Bitcoin ABC)16 with maximum block size of 32 MB,
and the other is called Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision (Bitcoin
15https://www.bitcoincash.org
16https://www.bitcoinabc.org
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SV)17 which supports block size up to 128 MB. However,
while providing a better number of TPS, the performance is
still limited. Additionally, since the PoW-based membership
selection requires competition in physical computing power,
this may put an extra constraint on the actual number of
consensus nodes in practice. For example, currently (as of Dec
2018), 14 mining pools collectively have 80.5% mining power
of the entire network, which shows the limit of scalability w.r.t.
the number of consensus nodes in practical 18.
On the other hand, BFT-based blockchain consensus pro-
vides good throughput [212] leading to potentially tens of
thousands of transactions per second. However, as BFT pro-
tocols normally require a pre-defined consensus group, they
cannot be applied directly into blockchains. This promotes
systems, such as ByzCoin and RepuCoin, to combine dif-
ferent membership selection algorithms with BFT consensus
algorithms, to adapt BFT protocols in Blockchain. The new
combinations also impose changes on the blockchain structure.
For example, with the combination of PoW+BFT, systems
(such as ByzCoin and RepuCoin) deployed paralleled chains.
Off-chain payments: Another proposal to improve
blockchain scalability is the use of payment, or state, channels.
These channels allow for transactions to be performed off-
chain with the same security as on-chain payments, which
results in overall higher throughput. Techniques such as the
Lightning Network [167] and Raiden [16] utilize off-chain
messages to perform transactions amongst parties. The mes-
sages and transactions are signed off-chain by both parties and
the on-chain transactions are used for final settlement.
E. Ancillary Components
Although this paper provides insight into three blockchain
components, namely the membership selection, consensus and
structure, there are a number of other components that form
the blockchain and heavily contribute and influence the design
and operation.
1) Cryptography
The blockchain heavily relies on cryptography for many
aspects of it’s operation. The cryptographic properties integrate
into the security of the blockchain, allowing it to provide
critical guarantees. The use of cryptography falls into a number
of aspects of the blockchain, each providing unique properties
and security.
Hash Functions: Hash functions provide the basis for the
mining performed on blockchains as well as integrating with
the coins and transactions. A cryptographically secure hash
function is a deterministic one-way function, that is pre-image
resistance and collision resistant. The pre-image resistance
property ensures that for any given hash value, it should
be difficult to find the original input message. The collision
17https://bitcoinsv.io
18https://www.blockchain.com/pools
resistance property guarantees that it is difficult to find two
different inputs, such that they share the same hash value.
During the mining process, the pre-image resistance prop-
erty of hash functions makes it difficult to find a number
that fits the threshold provided by the difficulty. The collision
resistance property makes it difficult19 to find a collision where
the hash of an entity leads to the same hash of another. This is
critical during the mining process, but also in the way trans-
actions and blocks are formed, as the hash should be unique
to identify each transaction and block uniquely. Furthermore,
the collision resistant deterministic one-way function also ties
into the user accounts, as each user account is addressed by a
hash, which if found to be non-unique may cause issues.
Authentication and Authorization: The use of public key
infrastructure forms the basis of wallets and user accounts.
Each account is given an associated private key and public
key which an address is then derived from. This ties a user
to valid signatures when they sign transactions, and is a large
component of the blockchain. Each transaction must be signed
with a valid signature from a user, and can be verified using the
wallets associated public key. Recently, a number of hardware-
based wallets have been released, such as the Trezor [12] and
the Ledger [7], providing hardware private keys to increase
the security for the users.
Transaction privacy: A major component of the
blockchain is transaction privacy. Zcash [190] and Mon-
ero [147] are two blockchains that are heavily working on
the privacy aspect of the blockchain.
Ring Signatures [185] allow a user in a group to create a
signature, in the way that a verifier can verify that the signature
is created by a member of the group, but does not know exactly
which member has created this signature. This allows the user
to stay anonymous when submitting transactions as part of the
group. This provides privacy for groups of users, however, it
can lead to double-spending of coins as a user can create two
transactions spending the same coin without being detected.
Linkable Ring Signature [131] addresses this problem by
revealing the identity of the signer if the signing key is used
more than once. A variant of Linkable Ring Signature [88]
is adopted by CryptoNote [99, 204]. In CryptoNote, an input
of a transaction is a Traceable Ring Signature, where the ring
contains one coin to be spent, and several decoy inputs known
as “mix-ins”. An observer only knows that one of the coins
in the ring is spent, but does not know which coin. Monero
further improved the work on privacy with ring signatures,
extending CryptoNote’s implementation by designing “Ring
Confidential Transactions” (RingCT) [154]. RingCT provides
anonymity of the transaction protecting both the user and the
transaction amount, allowing for a higher level of privacy
amongst transactions.
However, attacks on the privacy of CryptoNote-style
blockchains have been identified. Two concurrent papers [122,
149] found that there exists “zero-mix-in” transitions, where
19With the current computing technology and known mathematical princi-
ples.
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a ring only contains the real coin to be spent. This not only
provides no privacy guarantee on the transaction with zero-
mix-in, but also reduces the privacy of other transactions that
use the input of the zero-mix-in transitions. They also found
that other attributes of a coin, such as its age, leak information
on the likelihood of this coin being spend in a transaction.
Other work [215, 220, 222] show that even assuming all
transactions contain mix-ins, and all attributes do not leak any
information, the different ways to choose mix-ins or having
a hard fork would also leak information about the trace of
transactions. There are also network level analysis [50] on
the topology of such blockchains, as knowing the network
topology would help compromising the security and privacy
of a system.
ZCash, as well as a number of other blockchains [173],
are working on applying Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
(ZKPK) to the blockchain. ZKPK allows parties to prove
their knowledge without revealing any information about the
knowledge. For example, it allows users to prove possession of
information without revealing the actual information, retaining
privacy. The use of Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge on
the blockchain is becoming increasingly popular, allowing for
the verification of transactions and the verifying of arbitrary
computations [173]. The introduction of zk-SNARKs [224] in
the Zcash [190] blockchain sparked widespread interest into
the adoption of Zero Knowledge Proofs on the blockchain.
This will lead to an advancement of the cryptographic tech-
niques used as well as provide more insight into better privacy
and efficiency. Similar to the effort on security analysis of
CryptoNote-style blockchain, reducing the privacy guarantee
of Zcash is shown to be possible [115].
2) Internal Structures and Storage
Another component critical to the operation of the blockchain
is the use of internal structures. These structures are integral
to the operation of the blockchain and can help define what
functionality the blockchain can provide. The structures handle
the storage, retrieval and handling of data that is saved to the
chain, or, used as state.
In Bitcoin variants, the most common structure is the
in-memory map of storing Unspent Transaction Outputs
(UTXOs) [32], which tracks any unspent transaction outputs,
representing coins.
Ethereum uses prefix trees, or “Tries” [76], to handle state,
storage, transactions and receipts. Ethereum updates state
through blocks, the use of the state trie helps to append new
state to the chain, updating new balances, changing the state
and storage of smart contracts.
Other blockchains use a number of internal structures to
handle state, balances, account and transaction information,
and more. The choice of structures can impact on the chain
capabilities, differing with each implementation but still a core
component to consider.
3) Virtual Machines and Platforms
The Ethereum blockchain utilizes the Ethereum Virtual Ma-
chine (EVM) [109, 216] to run smart contracts and handle
state. Recently there have been efforts to move away from
the EVM and move into eWASM [171], a WebAssembly [15]
based virtual machine that will then handle the state. The shift
from the specialized Ethereum virtual machine to eWASM
will provide new support for different languages and provide
a more optimal execution.
F. Whitepaper Information
The rising interest of blockchains and its applications
promote an influx of proposals. These proposals encompass
a number of components, including membership selection,
consensus, structure, cryptography or others. Due to the nature
of the surrounding community, many of the proposals are
detailed informally by means of whitepapers [91, 124, 128,
150, 155, 168, 196, 201, 204, 205], which in some cases lack
peer review and are often shallow in terms of technical details.
Many whitepapers are written as public-facing documents
to support the future developments, or provide content for
potential investors to understand. This often leads to the
lack of formal models and technical details that form critical
components of the new proposals. Other whitepapers are
presented in a formal manner, clearly addressing the technical
details and formalizing models consistent with the literature.
The proposals conforming to this format are often able to be
critically evaluated and discussed thoroughly, however they
make up a minority of the proposed whitepapers. Although
this survey aims to provide an aggregation of proposals, it is
not exhaustive.
G. Deployment Issues
Currently, all mainstream blockchains are PoW-based. The
transition from Proof-of-Work to Proof-of-Stake can be seen
as a deployment challenge for employing the energy efficient
solutions. In particular, to constitute fairness for existing
miners, the transition period must reward the miners in such
a way that they are incentivized to drop mining. Most Proof-
of-Stake mechanisms planned today, for example Casper for
Ethereum [79, 225], increase the block difficulty to slowly
phase out mining by making it impractical. Other new systems,
such as the Proof-of-Activity [28], integrated the Proof-of-
Stake with the existing PoW-based system.
H. Future Outlook
One major upcoming release is the adoption of sharding
of the blockchain. The issue of scalability has been a factor
on improving the blockchain. Pruning of state [45], light
clients [43, 45, 81, 157, 229], block sizes [51] and others.
However, the issue of the size of the blockchain remains
unanswered, as the blockchain is growing over time, issues
of storage space and availability to smaller nodes arise. The
proposal of having a sharded blockchain [80] allows for a
reduction in the size of the chain by splitting it amongst
participants. However, the challenge of applying this while
maintaining the blockchain guarantees is currently in work.
Similar to payment channels, there have been propos-
als [23, 166] to have side-chains operating alongside the
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main blockchain, enabling the use of “tokens” or other added
functionality.
Recently, a number of cross-chain techniques have been
devised [124, 158, 203] to address the issue of governance and
allow for transactions across multiple blockchains, providing
an opportunity to diversify the blockchain model and open
possibilities to offer different guarantees for users.
As the blockchain matures, new mechanisms will be pro-
posed to improve the blockchain. The future developments will
impact performance, scalability or security of the blockchain
in a variety of ways.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although in its infancy, the blockchain paradigm is gener-
ating widespread interest. As with all successful concepts, the
current blockchain ecosystem quickly became quite complex
and difficult to understand, from both an introductory view
and an in-depth dive into the state of the art.
To address this problem, we deconstructed the blockchain
into three main critical components: membership selection,
consensus mechanism and structure. We introduced an eval-
uation framework to get insight into system models, desired
properties and analysis criteria, using the decoupled compo-
nents as parameters. We tested our approach by analyzing the
relevant state of the art, and performing a categorization of
how systems fit in the different criteria outlined.
The number of proposals for blockchains increases by the
month. However, we trust our framework to be comprehensive
enough that proposals can be added and classified in the future.
Improvements to the framework may include the addition of
quantitative examination of proposals.
This survey provided clear insight into the blockchain
proposals landscape, through a novel perspective — decon-
structing the blockchain complex into few simple but complete
critical components. We expect this work to be useful to the
community, providing direction and helping to simplify future
designs, such as inspiring innovative coherent combinations
revealed by our decomposition and categorization.
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